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ARTICLE 
Bringing the European Eel Back from the 
Brink: The Need for a New Agreement under 
the Convention on Migratory Species 
CHRIS WOLD* 
The European eel is considered “Critically Endangered.” Its 
population has been declining due to overutilization, barriers to mi-
gration such as dams, pollution, and climate change. The interna-
tional community has responded by including the European eel in 
Appendix II of the Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species (“CITES”) to regulate international trade and Appen-
dix II of the Convention on Migratory Species (“CMS”) to help im-
prove the species conservation status. The EU has taken regional 
action to prohibit imports into and exports from EU Member States, 
although intra-EU trade is permissible. Despite these actions, the 
eel’s conservation status might not be improving. The eel’s Appendix 
II status on CITES regulates only international trade. The CMS 
Appendix II listing does not impose any specific conservation obli-
gations on the Parties. No other international treaty has the compe-
tence to manage the full suite of threats across the eel’s range. 
Thus, European eel conservation would benefit from a new in-
ternational legal instrument negotiated under the auspices of CMS. 
Unlike other agreements, a legal instrument negotiated under CMS 
can cover the full range of the European eel’s freshwater and marine 
habitat and address the full range of threats to the species. CMS 
Agreements can be legally binding or not. Regardless of the instru-
ment’s legal status, it should prohibit or regulate taking; prohibit 
 
*  Professor of Law and Director, International Environmental Law Project, 
Lewis & Clark Law School; wold@lclark.edu. The author thanks the Sar-
gasso Sea Commission for supporting this work. He also thanks David Free-
stone, Matt Gollock, Erica Lyman, and Melanie Virtue for their extraordi-
narily valuable comments. 
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or regulate trade, potentially through a CDS; establish an advisory 
body to assess new scientific information and review management 
strategies; and include reporting obligations to help monitor the 
success or failure of management strategies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In books and movies, eels are commonly depicted as sneaky 
creatures with a propensity for tricking other creatures.1 The 
French idiom “there’s an eel under the rock” refers to a dubious 
situation.2 They are also considered to be dangerous creatures that 
bring catastrophes.3 In the Pacific island myth, the eel-god Tuna 
(the Samoan word for eel) takes the form of an eel to watch women 
bathe; a woman who eats an eel is considered possessed of an evil 
spirit.4 In other cultures, eels are sacred.5 
Regardless of their depiction in myth and movies, modern day 
eels are big business and in great peril. Maine fishermen have sold 
glass eels to Asian dealers for as much as $2,600 per pound.6 In 
2012, the Maine catch of glass eels was worth $38 million.7 In ad-
dition, as catadromous species, eels spawn in the marine environ-
ment and spend their adult lives in continental waters such as riv-
ers, lakes, estuaries, and lagoons.8 This catadromous life history 
makes them vulnerable to a variety of threats. In addition to over-
exploitation for Japanese cuisine, including sushi (unagi),9 eels en-
counter barriers to migration such as dams as they swim upstream 
and down.10 They also face threats from disease, parasites, and cli-
mate change.11 
 
1.  See, e.g., Little Mermaid, in which two eels, Flotsam and Jetsam, search for 
victims for the wicked Ursula; they were, for example, given the task of lur-
ing Ariel to Ursula’s lair. LITTLE MERMAID (Disney 1989). 
2.   Eric Feunteun & Tony Robinet, Freshwater Eels and People in France, in 
EELS AND HUMANS 75, 75 (Katsumi Tsukamoto & Mari Kuroki ed., (2014)) 
(in French, “Il y a anguille sous roche”). 
3.  Id. 
4.   2 ROBERT W. WILLIAMSON, THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF CENTRAL 
POLYNESIA 274 (1924). 
5.  T. Kieran McCarthy, Eels and People in Ireland: From Mythology to Inter-
national Eel Stock Conservation, in EELS AND HUMANS 13, 14–15 (Katsumi 
Tsukamoto & Mari Kuroki eds., 2014). 
6. Annie Sneed, American Eel Is in Endanger of Extinction, SCI. AM. (Dec. 1, 
2014), https://perma.cc/3NYR-BUQT.  
7.  Id. 
8. David M.P. Jacoby et al., Synergistic Patterns of Threat and the Challenges 
Facing Global Anguillid Eel Conservation, 4 GLOB. ECOLOGY & 
CONSERVATION 321, 322 (2015). 
9.  See infra Section II.C.1. 
10.  See infra Section II.C.2. 
11.  See infra Section II.C.3–4. 
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International concern has been growing for all eel species in 
the family Anguillidae due to their significant population de-
clines,12 but regional and international efforts have so far focused 
on the European eel (Anguilla anguilla). In 2007, the European 
Union (“EU”) adopted a regulation that requires EU Member 
Range States to prepare Eel Management Plans (“EMPs”) with a 
goal of 40% escapement of adult eels into the marine environ-
ment.13 Later in 2007, the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora (“CITES”)14 included the 
species in Appendix II.15 In 2008, the European eel was first listed 
as “Critically Endangered” on the International Union for Conser-
vation of Nature (“IUCN”) Red List of Threatened Species.16 That 
same year, the European eel was added to the List of Threatened 
and/or Declining Species in the Northeast Atlantic under the Con-
vention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-
East Atlantic (“OSPAR”).17 In 2014, the Convention on Migratory 
 
12.  Anguillid Eel Specialist Group (AESG): About AESG, IUCN FRESHWATER 
SPECIALIST GRP., https://perma.cc/23DD-7B5S (“For 30 years or more there 
has been growing concern amongst stakeholders in relation to the decline in 
recruitment and/or populations of a number of species within the family An-
guillidae.”). 
13.   The provision provides as follows: 
The objective of each Eel Management Plan shall be to reduce anthro-
pogenic mortalities so as to permit with high probability the escape-
ment to the sea of at least 40% of the silver eel biomass relative to the 
best estimate of escapement that would have existed if no anthropo-
genic influences had impacted the stock. The Eel Management Plan 
shall be prepared with the purpose of achieving this objective in the 
long term.   
Council Regulation 1100/2007, Establishing Measures for the Recovery of the 
Stock of European Eel, art. 2, 2007 O.J. (L 248) 1, 3, 4 (EC), 
https://perma.cc/7FCN-TXCG [hereinafter EU Eel Regulation]. 
14.  Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and 
Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force 
July 1, 1975), https://perma.cc/A6UP-M6V9 [hereinafter CITES].  
15.  CITES Appendices II, III (valid from Apr. 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/XV8Z-
YUW6.  
16.  DAVID JACOBY & MATT GOLLOCK, IUCN, THE IUCN RED LIST OF THREATENED 
SPECIES – ANGUILLA ANGUILLA, EUROPEAN EEL 1, 3 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/J8QZ-KVAA. The European eel was again classified as 
“Critically Endangered” in 2010 and 2014. Id. 
17.  OSPAR List of Threatened and/or Declining Species and Habitats (Ref. No. 
2008-6), pt. II, 2008, https://perma.cc/WV8U-VAJH. OSPAR is the treaty 
and commission through which fifteen States and “the EU cooperate to pro-
tect the marine environment of the North-East Atlantic” Ocean. About 
OSPAR, OSPAR COMM’N, https://perma.cc/A5B2-F4AL.  
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/1
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Species (“CMS”)18 included the European eel in Appendix II due to 
its unfavorable conservation status.19 Despite these actions, the 
eel’s conservation status may not be improving.20 The population 
remains in a “critical state”; the “promising increase” in recruit-
ment in some recent years “may or may not be the result of protec-
tive measures.”21 
Consequently, the CMS Secretariat and the Sargasso Sea 
Commission22 sponsored the First Range States Workshop on the 
European Eel to review the conservation status of and existing 
management measures for the species.23 That meeting concluded 
that a second workshop that includes additional Range States, par-
ticularly from North Africa, would be valuable.24 The meeting also 
concluded that the second workshop should focus on the nature of 
a CMS legal instrument for the European eel (legally binding or 
non-legally binding) and the feasibility of including the American 
eel in any such instrument at a later time.25 
 
18.  Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, June 
23, 1979, 1651 U.N.T.S. 333 (entered into force 1983), http://perma.cc/XP9Q-
GBWZ [hereinafter CMS]. 
19.  CMS Appendix II, at 14, https://perma.cc/GXL2-YMS5. The CMS Parties in-
clude species in Appendix II “which have an unfavourable conservation status 
and which require international agreements for their conservation and man-
agement, as well as those which have a conservation status which would sig-
nificantly benefit from the international cooperation that could be achieved by 
an international agreement.” CMS, supra note 18, at art. IV(1). 
20.  Willem Dekker, Management of the Eel Is Slipping through Our Hands!: 
Distribute Control and Orchestrate National Protection, 73 ICES J. MARINE 
SCI. 2442, 2443 (2016) (“Post-evaluation in 2015 recently indicated that 
hardly any improvement in the status of the stocks has been achieved, and 
that—on average—mortality has not been reduced any further since 2012.”). 
The generation length of the European eel is roughly 15 years, however. 
Jacoby et al., supra note 8, at 325, fig.1. As a consequence, it may be too early 
to determine whether existing measures are having a positive impact on the 
eel’s conservation status. 
21.  INT’L COUNCIL FOR THE EXPL. OF THE SEA, REPORT OF THE JOINT 
EIFAAC/ICES WORKING GROUP ON EELS (WGEEL), ICES CM 
2013/ACOM:18, at 180 (2013), https://perma.cc/2RSX-AV6G.  
22.  For more information on the Sargasso Sea Commission, see SARGASSO SEA 
COMM’N, https://perma.cc/55RX-CJX5. 
23.  Documents for the meeting can found at The First Range State Workshop on 
the European Eel, CMS, https://perma.cc/YR9Z-ARH9. 
24.  CMS, Rep. of the First Range States Workshop on the European Eel, Doc. 
UNEP/CMS/Eels WS1/Report, ¶ 145 (Oct. 13–14, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/4DX2-DGNF. 
25.  Id. ¶ 145-58. 
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At the Twelfth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to 
CMS,26 the Parties adopted a “concerted action”27 for the European 
Eel28 that calls on CMS Parties to convene a second workshop of 
Range States “to explore all options that might help to strengthen 
conservation efforts for the European eel.”29 In particular, the 
meeting “should focus on exploring synergies between existing in-
struments, to solidify the role of CMS, and associated mecha-
nism[s] of implementation, in on-going conservation efforts.”30 
In light of these events, this Article assesses the nature and 
content that a CMS instrument could play in strengthening con-
servation measures for the European eel. It reviews existing le-
gally binding and non-legally binding CMS instruments and exam-
ines the relative advantages and disadvantages of each type of 
instrument for the conservation and management of the European 
eel. It also explores and sets out the possible content of an instru-
ment, including measures to protect the eel’s migration and spawn-
ing grounds. 
To accomplish these tasks, Section II begins by briefly summa-
rizing the life history and scientific gaps in knowledge of European 
eels, as well as the various threats to the species, for the purpose 
of determining whether and to what extent an international agree-
 
26.  For information about and documents from this meeting, see Twelfth Meet-
ing of the Conference of the Parties to CMS, CMS, https://perma.cc/RQ93-
GVBR.  
27.  “Concerted actions” are defined as: 
[P]riority conservation measures, projects, or institutional arrange-
ments undertaken to improve the conservation status of selected Ap-
pendix I and Appendix II species or selected groups of Appendix I and 
Appendix II species that  
 a) involve measures that are the collective responsibility of Par-
ties acting in concert; or  
b) are designed to support the conclusion of an instrument un-
der Article IV of the Convention and enable conservation measures to 
be progressed in the meantime or represent an alternative to such an 
instrument[.]  
CMS Res. 12.28, Concerted Actions, Doc. UNEP/CMS/Res. 12.28, ¶ 1 (Oct. 
2017), https://perma.cc/L6C4-GHT4.  
28.  CMS, Concerted Action on the European Eel (Anguilla anguilla), 
Doc. UNEP/CMS/Concerted Action 12.1 (Oct. 2017), https://perma.cc/B3D5-
HD2M [hereinafter CMS Concerted Action on the European Eel].   
29.  Id. at 1. 
30.  Id. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/1
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ment might be necessary. Section III describes the need for inter-
national cooperation to conserve and manage the European eel 
given the scientific information included in Section II. Section IV 
evaluates the different types of CMS legal instruments, assessing 
in particular the similarities and differences between legally bind-
ing and non-legally binding instruments. Section V addresses 
whether CMS is the proper forum for developing an international 
instrument for the European eel in light of other international 
agreements and the CMS criteria found in CMS Resolution 12.8 
for evaluating potential new legal instruments. Section VI explores 
the possible content of an instrument, including key elements of 
such an instrument for the conservation of the European eel. Sec-
tion VII briefly comments on the possible extension of a CMS in-
strument concerning the European eel to the American eel (A. ros-
trata), which faces similar threats. Finally, Section VIII concludes 
that the role of CMS in European eel conservation must be solidi-
fied because only CMS has the flexibility and breadth to address 
all of the threats to the European eel across its full geographic 
range. 
II. CONSERVATION STATUS OF THE EUROPEAN 
EEL 
A. Life History 
The European eel is one of 16 anguillid species.31 Anguillids 
are unusual among aquatic species for a variety of reasons. They 
are facultatively catadromous: they spawn in the marine environ-
ment and live the majority of their lives in continental waters such 
as rivers, lakes, estuaries, lagoons, and coastal waters.32 They are 
also unusual among aquatic species in that they reproduce just 
once before dying.33 On average, the generation length of the Eu-
ropean eel has been estimated at 15 years,34 and it is widely dis-
persed, inhabiting the marine and freshwater environments of 57 
 
31.  Jacoby et al., supra note 8, at 323. 
32.  Id. at 322. 
33.  Id. at 323. 
34.  Id. at 325, tbl.1. 
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States and territories.35 Despite this wide dispersal, the European 
eel is considered a single stock—that is, it is panmictic36 because 
all adults spawn in the southwestern part of the Sargasso Sea.37 
The European eel’s life history makes for fascinating study. 
The eel’s leptocephalus larvae hatch in Sargassum38 and then drift 
with the ocean currents towards Europe and North Africa.39 The 
larvae metamorphose as they cross the ocean; by the time they 
reach the continental shelf of Europe and North Africa, they have 
completed their metamorphosis into transparent “glass eels” and 
enter continental waters.40 After a period of time, they begin to 
take on pigmentation and become known as elvers.41 Continuing 
their transformation, European eels then enter their growth stage, 
during which they are known as yellow eels.42 During this time, 
they eat a wide range of insects, worms, molluscs, crustaceans, and 
fish.43 This stage shows great variation: the transformation into a 
 
35.  Albania; Algeria; Austria; Belarus; Belgium; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bul-
garia; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Egypt; Estonia; Faroe Is-
lands; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany; Gibraltar; Greece; Guernsey; 
Iceland; Ireland; Isle of Man; Israel; Italy; Jersey; Latvia; Lebanon; Libya; 
Lithuania; Luxembourg; Macedonia, the former Yugoslav Republic of; 
Malta; Mauritania; Moldova; Monaco; Montenegro; Morocco; Netherlands; 
Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Russian Federation; Serbia; Slovakia; 
Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Syrian Arab Republic; Tunisia; Tur-
key; Ukraine; United Kingdom. JACOBY & GOLLOCK, supra note 16, at 4. 
36.  INT’L COUNCIL FOR THE EXPL. OF THE SEA, REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON EEL 
AND CITES 33 (2015), https://perma.cc/UGD8-MY2E [hereinafter REPORT OF 
THE WORKSHOP ON EELS AND CITES]. The report notes that scientists are not 
sure “[w]hether this panmixia is achieved by random mating of adults in the 
spawning area in the southwestern part of the Sargasso Sea or by random 
dispersal of the larvae on their route towards the continent.” Id. 
37. INT’L COUNCIL FOR THE EXPL. OF THE SEA, REPORT OF THE JOINT 
EIFAAC/ICES/GFCM WORKING GROUP ON EEL (WGEEL) 8 (2015), 
http://perma.cc/7CQP-MS7L [hereinafter 2015 WGEEL REPORT]. 
38.  Sargassum is a Genus of Large Brown Algae that Floats in Island-like 
Masses, U.S. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://perma.cc/KE5N-
ZLAU. The Sargasso Sea is roughly 3,000 km2. Rep. of the First Range 
States Workshop on the European Eel, supra note 24, ¶ 21 (statement of 
Éric Feunteun). 
39.  JACOBY & GOLLOCK, supra note 16, at 4. 
40.  2015 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 37, at 8. 
41.  INT’L COUNCIL FOR THE EXPL. OF THE SEA, REPORT OF THE JOINT 
EIFAAC/ICES/GFCM WORKING GROUP ON EEL (WGEEL) 196 (2014), 
http://perma.cc/6WSG-NW9L [hereinafter 2014 WGEEL REPORT]. 
42.  Id.  
43.  Id. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/1
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yellow eel “may take place in marine, brackish (transitional), or 
freshwaters,” and the stage may last from 2 to 25 years but can 
exceed 50 years,44 depending on “temperature (latitude and longi-
tude), ecosystem characteristics, and density-dependent pro-
cesses.”45 Sexual differentiation occurs during this life history 
stage, but the mechanism is not fully understood.46 Sexual differ-
entiation likely depends on a number of factors, particularly den-
sity; males predominate in areas of high eel density, and females 
predominate as eel density decreases.47 Rapidly growing individu-
als typically become males, whereas slow-growing eels tend to de-
velop as females.48 High temperatures and saline conditions may 
also favor development.49 
As a result of these factors, eels metamorphose into silver eels 
and reach sexual maturity more quickly in the southern part of 
their range.50 Silver eels then migrate to the Sargasso Sea where 
they spawn and die; incredibly, no one has yet seen a European eel 
spawn.51  
B. Declines 
Determining either positive or negative changes in the global 
stock of the European eel “is difficult due to limited data and the 
poor understanding of the relationship between recruitment, fresh-
water populations, and escapement.”52 Nonetheless, scientists 
agree that the species as a whole continues to decline.53 
 
44.  2015 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 37, at 8. 
45.  Id. See also OSPAR COMM’N, BACKGROUND DOCUMENT FOR EUROPEAN EEL: 
ANGUILLA ANGUILLA 5 (2010), https://perma.cc/MZ6X-6GLW. 
46.  2014 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 41, at 196. 
47.  Daniele Bevacqua et al., A Global Viability Assessment of the European Eel, 
21 GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY 3323, 3330 (2015); Andrew J. H. Davey & Don-
ald J. Jellyman, Sex Determination in Freshwater Eels and Management 
Options for Manipulation of Sex, 15 REVS. IN FISH BIOLOGY & FISHERIES 37, 
37–38, 43 (2005) (“High proportions of female silver eels migrating from 
some upstream areas, lakes and large rivers may be due to low population 
density or poor conditions for growth in these habitats.”).  
48.  Davey & Jellyman, supra note 47, at 37.  
49.  Id. at 37–38.  
50.  2015 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 37, at 8. 
51.  2014 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 41, at 9. 
52.  JACOBY & GOLLOCK, supra note 16, at 6. 
53.  Id. at 8. 
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Using data sets from certain countries where data has been 
gathered over a longer time period, scientists report dramatic de-
clines—approximately 90%—in the recruitment of glass eels since 
the early 1980s.54 Recruitment hit a low point in 2011 with a re-
cruitment rate of less than 1% for the North Sea and less than 5% 
elsewhere in the species’ range relative to recruitment between 
1960 and 1979.55 
Yellow and silver eels have also experienced declines of greater 
than 50% over three generations (45 years).56 These declines are 
perhaps less pronounced than expected “partially due to density 
dependent mortality”; however, more precipitous declines may be 
masked by the broad age range of yellow eels that could create “a 
time lag in knock-on population effects”57 and a lack of data.58 
C. Threats 
The complex life history of the European eel challenges our 
understanding of how different threats impact or potentially im-
pact the species,59 and the contribution of each threat to the eel’s 
decline is not fully understood.60 Nonetheless, this Article summa-
rizes these threats to put the global conservation challenge in per-
spective and to underscore the need for global, multilateral solu-
tions.61 For example, scientists believe that the population decline 
of the European eel is caused by a variety of threats, including 
 
54.  Id. at 7. 
55.  Id. See also 2015 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 37, at 9. 
56.  JACOBY & GOLLOCK, supra note 16, at 7. 
57.  Id. 
58.  Personal Communication with Dr. Matthew Gollock, Marine and Freshwa-
ter Programme Manager, Zoological Society of London (Sept. 15, 2017).  
59.  Matthew Gollock, Briefing Paper for the Workshop of European Eel Range 
States, at 2 (2015), https://perma.cc/TJ5F-VCB8. See also 2014 WGEEL 
REPORT, supra note 41, at 9 (stating that “the reasons for this decline are 
uncertain”); Jacoby et al., supra note 8, at 326 (stating that “our ability to 
determine the individual effects of these threats on population trends is com-
plicated by the multiple life-stages across a range of environments” and 
“how these stressors combine to contribute to declines in abundance of par-
ticular life-stages is still poorly understood”). 
60.  JACOBY & GOLLOCK, supra note 16, at 11 (stating that “the significance of 
any single threat, or the synergy it may have with other threats, is still 
poorly understood”). 
61.  This article does not attempt to describe the various threats in detail; this 
has been done elsewhere. See, e.g., id. at 11–12; Gollock, supra note 59, at 
2–10. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/1
   
178 Pace Environmental Law Review [Vol. 35 
“overexploitation, pollution, non-native parasites and other dis-
eases, migratory barriers and other habitat loss, mortality during 
passage through water turbines or pumps, and/or oceanic-factors 
affecting migrations.”62 Significantly, these different threats affect 
the European eel throughout its range.63 
1. Overutilization 
Overutilization of European eels—from the glass eel stage to 
the silver eel stage—for food and bait is potentially a significant 
threat to the species.64 In fact, all 13 eel species assessed by the 
IUCN were considered potentially threatened by fishing, harvest-
ing, and other uses.65 With the decline of endangered Japanese eel 
(A. japonica),66 the European eel has been the preferred eel for 
Asian food markets.67 Despite the EU’s import/export ban, a black 
market for European eel persists; estimates place the black-mar-
ket price between $1,200 and $1,500 per kilo ($545 to $680 per 
pound) in Asia.68 Since the EU import/export ban, greater pressure 
has been placed on the American eel, which has fetched up to 
$2,600 per pound;69 in 2012, the Maine catch of glass eels was 
worth $38 million.70 Also since the EU ban, exports of the shortfin 
eel (A. bicolor) in the glass eel stage from the Philippines have 
sharply increased.71 In addition, in parts of the European eel’s 
North African range (specifically Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia), 
 
62.  Gollock, supra note 59, at 2–10; 2014 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 41, at 9. 
63.  2014 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 41, at 9. 
64.  Gollock, supra note 59, at 4 (stating that “[t]he glass eel fishery is also argu-
ably the activity that removes the greatest number of eels from the aquatic 
system”). 
65.  Jacoby et al., supra note 8, at 326. 
66. DAVID JACOBY & MATT GOLLOCK, IUCN, THE IUCN RED LIST OF THREATENED 
SPECIES – ANGUILLA JAPONICA, JAPANESE EEL 1, 7–8 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/X6GP-LFSZ.   
67.  JACOBY & GOLLOCK, supra note 16, at 9. 
68.  Emma Bryce, Illegal Eel: Black Market Continues to Taint Europe’s Eel Fish-
ery, GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2016), https://perma.cc/SEA7-PH2K. 
69.  Sneed, supra note 6, at 3. 
70.  Id. 
71.  Jacoby et al., supra note 8, at 326; VICKI CROOK, TRAFFIC INT’L & 
ZOOLOGICAL SOC’Y OF LONDON, SLIPPING AWAY: INTERNATIONAL ANGUILLA EEL 
TRADE AND THE ROLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 12–17 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/ZX4C-P4SL.  
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as well as generally,72 exports have risen dramatically, causing the 
CITES Animals Committee to recommend in July 2017 further in-
vestigation pursuant to its Review of Significant Trade.73 
Regarding the European eel, EU Member States still catch 15 
to 17 metric tons of glass eels annually for domestic markets, 
where they are placed in aquaculture farms to grow until they are 
of marketable size.74 Some stakeholders suspect that the total 
catch is more than twice that.75 In fact, France has allocated itself 
a quota of slightly more than 57 metric tons, which is roughly twice 
the total allowed for EU consumption and restocking.76 
2. Habitat Loss/Barriers to Migration 
Barriers to migration, such as dams, constitute a significant 
threat to the European eel.77 Existing dams and the construction 
of new dams are of great concern; in fact, Turkey—a Range State 
of the European eel—has proposed building 575 new hydroelectric 
dams.78 Such barriers constrain both upstream and downstream 
eel migration. As eels move upstream, dams pose an obvious ob-
struction to potential growth habitat. A study of 335 dams (only 
one with a functioning fish ladder) in Puerto Rico found American 
eels upstream of 50% of dams shorter than 2.95 feet (0.9 meters) 
but only 5% of those dams taller than 9.84 feet (3 meters).79 In ad-
 
72.  U.N. Env’t World Conservation Monitoring Ctr., Selection of Species for In-
clusion in the Review of Significant Trade Following CoP17, Doc. 
A/AC.29/13.3, annex 2, at 31 (2017), https://perma.cc/RV9T-QAUL.  
73.  CITES Animals Comm., Rep. on the Twenty-Ninth Meeting of the Animals 
Comm., Doc. A/AC.29/21, at 3 (July 18–22, 2017), https://perma.cc/KB4A-
227Q; CITES Dec. 17.188 (2016), https://perma.cc/U9JY-XF9Y (adopting the 
recommendations in AC29 Com. 5).  
74.  Bryce, supra note 68.  
75.  As many as 20 tons of European eel are thought to be exported illegally to 
Asia. Emma Bryce, Illegal Eel: Who Is Pilfering Europe’s Catch?, GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 31, 2016), https://perma.cc/XC4G-EPH8.  
76.  Id.; Andrew Kerr, Sustainable Eel Grp., Eels III: European Eel Recovery: “It 
is All About Collaboration” (June 22, 2016).  
77.  Gollock, supra note 59, at 7.  
78.  2015 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 37, at 66. 
79.  Patrick B. Cooney & Thomas J. Kwak, Spatial Extent and Dynamics of Dam 
Impacts on Tropical Island Freshwater Fish Assemblages, 63 BIOSCIENCE 
176, 182 (2013). 
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dition, “considerable” habitat, much of which is suitable eel habi-
tat, has been lost due to wetland reclamation projects, floodplain 
drainage, and dredging, among other reasons.80 
3. Disease and Parasites 
The introduction of the Japanese eel into Europe in the 1980s 
for aquaculture also led to the introduction of the parasitic nema-
tode Anguillicola crassus.81 A. crassus may impact the ability of 
European eels to reach their spawning grounds due to its adverse 
impacts on the fitness traits associated with the silvering stage of 
maturation.82 However, the impacts on eel migration and repro-
ductive success could be either negative or positive.83 Eels infected 
with A. crassus demonstrate impaired swimming performance due 
to damaged swim-bladders.84 Silver eels have “much higher infec-
tion levels than yellow eels,” and infected migrating silver eels may 
not be able to reach the spawning grounds.85 Further, infected eels 
may not be able to manage high pressure during their reproductive 
migration.86 Conversely, infected eels may accelerate their meta-
morphosis and migrate and reproduce “before the energetic cost 
imposed by the parasite becomes too high,” which could lead to 
overall positive impacts on eels.87 
 
80. Eric Feunteun, Management and Restoration of European Eel Population 
(Anguilla anguilla): An Impossible Bargain, 18 ECOLOGICAL ENGINEERING 
575, 579 (2002). 
81.  François Lefebvre et al., On the Origin of Anguillicoloides crassus, The In-
vasive Nematode of Anguillid Eels, 7 AQUATIC INVASIONS 443 (2012). 
82.  Géraldine Fazio et al., Swim Bladder Nematodes (Anguillicoloides crassus) 
Disturb Silvering in European Eels (Anguilla anguilla), 98 J. PARASITOLOGY 
695, 695 (Sept. 7, 2012). 
83.  Id. 
84.  Arjan P. Palstra et al., Swimming Performance of Silver Eels is Severely Im-
paired by the Swim-Bladder Parasite Anguillicola crassus, 352 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL MARINE BIOLOGY & ECOLOGY 244, 245 (2007).  
85.  Id. at 245, 252. 
86.  N.B. Sjöberg et al., Effects of the Swimbladder Parasite Anguillicola crassus 
on the Migration of European Silver Eels Anguilla anguilla in the Baltic Sea, 
74 J. FISH BIOLOGY 2158, 2166 (2009). 
87.  Fazio et al., supra note 82, at 703. 
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4. Pollution and Climate Change 
European eels require stores of fat to make the long migration 
from their continental freshwater habitats to the Sargasso Sea.88 
Consequently, they may be more susceptible to bioaccumulation of 
pollutants.89 Researchers have found that accumulation of lipo-
philic chemical pollutants, such as polychlorinated biphenyls 
(“PCBs”), in maturing eels could have potentially toxic effects on 
the survival period of the fertilized eggs.90 In addition, because 
these pollutants are stored by the fish and released when fat stores 
are broken down during migration, they could impair the ability of 
silver eels to complete their spawning migrations.91 
Climate change may also affect the abundance of European 
eels by changing oceanic conditions on which the eels depend to 
drift to near-shore habitat.92 Such changes could impact breeding 
grounds in the Sargasso Sea and alter the recruitment of glass eels 
to near-shore and freshwater environments.93 Climate change is 
also increasingly affecting and reducing freshwater habitats due to 
drought.94 Scientists are quick to caution that climatic changes 
and associated changes in oceanic conditions also occur naturally 
and have influenced eel populations for millennia.95 However, po-
tential climate impacts, when combined with the other impacts de-
scribed in this section, are new. Thus, the exact influence of climate 
change on the European eel remains speculative. 
 
88.  Vincent J.T. van Ginneken & Guido E.E.J.M. van den Thillart, Physiol-
ogy: Eel Fat Stores Are Enough to Reach the Sargasso, 403 NATURE 156, 156–
57 (2000). 
89.  Gollock, supra note 59, at 10.  
90.  Arjan P. Palstra et al., Are Dioxin-like Contaminants Responsible for the Eel 
(Anguilla anguilla) Drama?, 93 NATURWISSENSCHAFTEN 145, 148 (2006). 
91. Tony T. Robinet & Eric E. Feunteun, Sublethal Effects of Exposure to Chem-
ical Compounds: A Cause for the Decline in Atlantic Eels?, 11 
ECOTOXICOLOGY 265, 272 (2002). 
92. JACOBY & GOLLOCK, supra note 16, at 12–13. 
93. Id.  
94. Personal Communication with Gollock, supra note 58. 
95. Id. 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/1
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III. THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION 
A diversity of habitats, threats, management strategies, data 
collection efforts, and other factors all suggest that multilateral ef-
forts to conserve the European eel are needed. A variety of regional 
and international agreements have adopted or could adopt 
measures to conserve and manage European eels. However, for the 
reasons discussed below, they are inadequate to meet the chal-
lenges facing the European eel. Consequently, the European eel 
would benefit from an international agreement focused solely on 
the European eel. 
Some species, due to their life history characteristics or the 
numerous threats they face, fall through the cracks of interna-
tional law.96 Due to the life history traits of highly migratory spe-
cies such as tunas, cetaceans, and albatrosses, these species swim 
or fly in and out of the inland waters, territorial seas, and exclusive 
economic zones of a number of coastal States, as well as the high 
seas.97 Consequently, national legislation or treaties with a limited 
geographic scope will be inadequate to provide management and 
conservation measures throughout such a species’ range, and, 
thus, are likely to be ineffective. 
Species facing numerous threats encounter different prob-
lems. Many treaties lack the comprehensive scope necessary to ad-
dress multiple threats. CITES, for example, may help regulate and 
monitor international trade in specimens of a species, but it does 
not have the authority to protect that species from domestic trade 
or habitat destruction.98 
The European eel exemplifies both of these challenges. With 
57 Range States and territories,99 individual efforts to manage and 
conserve the European eel are unlikely to be effective. Moreover, 
 
96. See Chris Wold, World Heritage Species: A New Legal Approach to Conser-
vation, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 337, 339–42 (2008). 
97.  See, e.g., Dale W. Rice & Karl W. Kenyon, Breeding Distribution, History, 
and Populations of North Pacific Albatrosses, 79 THE AUK 365 (1962) (de-
scribing the distribution and life history of various albatrosses).  
98.  CITES, supra note 14, at art. XIV(1).  
99.  For a list of the States and territories, see supra note 35. 
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scientists are not sure if all parts of the breeding population con-
tribute to reproduction;100 consequently, “since any part of the con-
tinental stock might be essential to the overall status of the stock, 
all parts must be protected at least to the minimum acceptable 
level . . . whatever that level is.”101 Even regional law, such as the 
EU Eel Regulation, is inadequate because the European eel’s range 
extends outside the territories of EU Member States to include 
North African countries as well as non-EU European countries and 
territories, such as Norway, Iceland, and the Faroe Islands.102 
Moreover, the European eel’s spawning habitat occurs in the Sar-
gasso Sea,103 part of which lies beyond the jurisdiction of any State. 
In fact, the status of the European eel has not improved and mor-
tality of the eel has not declined appreciably since EU Member 
States began developing EMPs pursuant to the EU regulation.104 
The EU itself recognizes that eel management requires more at-
tention due to the range of threats to the eel from fishing as well 
as dams and other barriers to migration, habitat loss or degrada-
tion, pollution, diseases, and parasites.105 However, EU Member 
States cannot address these threats alone. Threats such as pollu-
tion clearly require a multilateral response. 
At the international level, no organization or treaty has legal 
competence to address the suite of threats faced by the European 
eel throughout its range. Several regional fisheries management 
organizations (“RFMOs”) might have some authority to manage 
the European eel, but their geographical scope, membership, or 
management authority is inadequate to meaningfully protect the 
eel. For example, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization 
 
100. REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON EELS AND CITES, supra note 36, at 33.  
101. Id. 
102. See supra note 35. 
103. See, e.g., INT’L COUNCIL FOR THE EXPL. OF THE SEA, REPORT OF THE WORKING 
GROUP ON EELS (WGEEL) 6 (2016), https://perma.cc/AQ8W-WRDU [herein-
after 2016 WGEEL REPORT]. 
104. Dekker, supra note 20, at 2443. 
105. Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
the Outcome of the Implementation of the Eel Management Plans, including 
an Evaluation of the Measures concerning Restocking and of the Evolution 
of Market Prices for Eels Less Than 12 cm in Length, at 8, COM (2014) 640 
final (Oct. 21, 2014), https://perma.cc/C4TZ-CLNX [hereinafter Eel Imple-
mentation Report].  
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(“NAFO”)106 applies its Conservation Measures only in areas be-
yond national jurisdiction.107 The General Fisheries Commission 
for the Mediterranean (“GFCM”)108 has competence only with re-
spect to fisheries of the Mediterranean and Black Seas.109 The Con-
vention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic 
Sea110 has broad jurisdiction to address pollution111 and promote 
ecological restoration,112 but its geographic scope is limited to the 
Baltic Sea.113 
The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlan-
tic Tuna (“ICCAT”)114 covers the entire Atlantic Ocean, but it does 
not have the authority to address direct harvest of eels or protect 
freshwater habitats; it may manage only tuna and tuna-like spe-
cies and those fish caught while fishing for tuna.115 The area of 
 
106. NAFO is established by the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation 
in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. See Convention on Future Multilateral 
Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, Oct. 24, 1978, 1135 
U.N.T.S. 369 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1979), https://perma.cc/69R8-CFHK 
[hereinafter NAFO Convention]. 
107. The NAFO Convention defines both a “Convention Area,” which includes 
areas under national jurisdiction, and a “Regulatory Area,” which does not. 
Id. at art. I(1)–(2). NAFO applies its conservation measures only to the Reg-
ulatory Area: “The [2017 Conservation and Enforcement Measures] shall, 
unless otherwise provided, apply to all fishing vessels used or intended for 
use for the purposes of commercial fishing activities conducted on fisheries 
resources in the Regulatory Area.” NAFO, Conservation and Enforcement 
Measures, at art. 2(1), FC Doc. 17-01 (2017), https://perma.cc/PL4F-JKHG.   
108. The General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (“GFCM”) was 
established under the provisions of Article XIV of the FAO Constitution. See 
Agreement for the Establishment of the General Fisheries Commission for 
the Mediterranean, Preamble, https://perma.cc/6R4B-66N4; General Fisher-
ies Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM), FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE 
U.N., https://perma.cc/A6Y7-TJ65. (entered into force Feb. 20 1952).  
109. See Agreement for the Establishment of the General Fisheries Commission 
for the Mediterranean, supra note 108, at arts. 3–4. 
110. Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea, 
Apr. 9, 1992 (entered into force Jan. 17, 2000), https://perma.cc/TJ66-VB4L. 
This convention is more frequently referred to as the Helsinki Convention 
and its commission as HELCOM. 
111. Id. at arts. 3, 5, 6, 8, 11. 
112. Id. at arts. 3, 15. 
113. Id. at arts. 1, 4(1). 
114. ICCAT was established by the International Convention for the Conserva-
tion of Atlantic Tunas. See International Convention for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tunas, May 14, 1966, 20 U.S.T. 2887, annex I, at 5, 
https://perma.cc/X7YT-V55K [hereinafter ICCAT]. 
115. ICCAT provides: 
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competence of the Western Central Atlantic Fishery Commission 
(“WECAFC”) includes the Sargasso Sea,116 but it has no manage-
ment authority,117 and its jurisdictional scope, like the other 
RFMOs, does not extend to the freshwater rivers where eels spend 
a significant part of their life history and where most eels are cap-
tured for trade.118 
Other treaties have taken steps to protect European eels, but 
they do not cover the spectrum of threats facing European eels. 
CITES, for example, has included the European eel in Appendix 
II.119 Consequently, Parties must issue export permits that verify 
that the trade will not be detrimental to the survival of the species 
and that the eels were legally acquired.120 CITES does not, how-
ever, have the authority to issue rules to protect the eel’s spawning 
habitat in the Sargasso Sea, require fish ladders to allow eels to 
migrate past dams, or otherwise adopt habitat conservation 
 
In order to carry out the objectives of this Convention the Commission 
shall be responsible for the study of the populations of tuna and tuna-
like fishes (the Scombriformes with the exception of the families 
Trichiuridae and Gempylidae and the genus Scomber) and such other 
species of fishes exploited in tuna fishing in the Convention area as 
are not under investigation by another international fishery organi-
zation. 
Id. at annex I, at art. IV(1). 
116. The WECAFC area of competence includes all marine waters of the Western 
Central Atlantic bounded by a line drawn as follows: 
From a point on the coast of South America at 5° 00’ N latitude in a 
northerly direction along this coast past the Atlantic entry to the Pan-
ama Canal; thence continue along the coasts of Central and North 
America to a point on this coast at 35° 00’ N latitude; thence due east 
along this parallel to 42°00’ W longitude; thence due north along this 
meridian to 36° 00’ N latitude; thence due east along this parallel to 
40°00’ W longitude; thence due south along this meridian to 5° 00’ N 
latitude; thence due west along this parallel to the original point at 5° 
00’ N latitude on the coast of South America. 
FAO Res. 4/61, Establishment of the Western and Central Atlantic Fishery 
Commission, ¶ 1, https://perma.cc/8LXH-2VKD.  
117. Id. ¶ 2. 
118. Id. ¶ 1. 
119. CITES Appendix II, supra note 15.  
120. CITES, supra note 14, at art. IV(2). Similar permit rules relating to “intro-
duction from the sea” may apply if the species is taken in the marine envi-
ronment not under the jurisdiction of any State. Id. at art. IV(6); CITES Res. 
Conf. 14.6 (Rev. CoP16), Introduction from the Sea, annex III(1) (June 2017), 
https://perma.cc/NYF6-UANB. 
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measures. The present Appendix II listing under CMS121 does not 
require Parties to undertake any conservation activities,122 even 
though the scope of CMS allows it to address habitat, trade, and 
other threats.123 Appendix II species receive protection under CMS 
only after development of a separate “Agreement.”124 
Other factors show the weakness of current legal regimes to 
conserve the European eel. For example, after the EU closed its 
borders to exports of European eels, exports of the American eel 
increased to meet demand in Asia.125 Exports of other eel species 
also increased in response to declining Japanese eel populations 
and to the EU’s prohibition against exports of European eels.126 
In addition, management of European eels has typically taken 
place at the local level, although with the enactment of the Euro-
pean Eel Regulation, some level of national oversight now takes 
place.127 Nonetheless, management across the EU and the larger 
eel range remains uncoordinated,128 and the conservation status of 
the European eel continues to be of great concern.129 Local man-
agement is unlikely to take into account stock-wide conservation of 
eels and more likely to respond to local constituent desires.130 Per-
haps consistent with local management, countries in the Mediter-
ranean Sea region have, over time, developed different methods for 
gathering catch composition and effort data,131 making efforts by 
scientists to assess the status of the European eel more difficult. 
 
121. CMS Appendix II, supra note 19.  
122. See CMS, supra note 18, at art. IV. 
123. Id. at art. V. 
124. Id. at arts. IV–V. 
125. Sneed, supra note 6. 
126. Jacoby et al., supra note 8, at 326 (noting increases in exports of the Indian 
shortfin eel (A. bicolor) from the Philippines). 
127. Dekker, supra note 20, at 2445. 
128. Steps are being taken to coordinate efforts, for example, by the GFCM in the 
WGEEL, but this is a recent development. Personal Communication with 
Gollock, supra note 58. 
129. Dekker, supra note 20, at 2445 (stating that “[t]he historical decline of the 
stock indicates that uncoordinated actions by local managers alone could not 
sustain the stock”). 
130. Id. at 2445–46.  
131. 2015 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 37, at 87–88; Dekker, supra note 20, at 
2445. 
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IV. CMS INSTRUMENTS 
As described above, the conservation of the European eel 
would benefit from international management. With an interna-
tional agreement, reporting of scientific information could be 
standardized or data collection harmonized; scientific needs and 
priorities could be determined on a region-wide basis; scientific 
analysis of relevant information could be channeled towards poli-
cymaking across the eel’s range; and local management efforts 
could be informed by stock-wide assessments and conservation 
needs with local efforts also informing those stock-wide assess-
ments. Moreover, the possibility for stakeholder involvement in eel 
management, which to date “has varied from country to coun-
try,”132 could be assured. 
At the First Range States Workshop on the European Eel, par-
ticipants generally agreed that an international instrument would 
benefit the conservation status of the European eel and that CMS 
could play a role in developing that instrument.133 The CMS Par-
ties later agreed that a second Range States meeting should ex-
plore how to “solidify the role of CMS” in European eel conserva-
tion.134 Indeed, CMS, with the possibility for legally binding and 
non-legally binding instruments, provides an opportunity to coor-
dinate eel conservation efforts. Using CMS has several advantages 
over other fora: 
1. CMS already has a Secretariat that can organize negotia-
tions;135 
2. CMS has included the European eel in Appendix II, 
thereby recognizing the need for an international legal in-
strument to improve the conservation status of the spe-
cies;136 
3. CMS legal instruments have the capacity to address the 
full range of threats facing the European eel;137 
 
132. Dekker, supra note 20, at 2447. 
133. Rep. of the First Range States Workshop on the European Eel, supra note 
24, ¶ 70. Some participants did question the need for an international legal 
instrument. Id. ¶ 36 (statement of Evangelia Georgitsi, Directorate General 
of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries of the European Commission (DG-Mare)). 
134. CMS Concerted Action on the European Eel, supra note 28, at 1. 
135. CMS, supra note 18, at art. VII(2). 
136. Id. at art. IV. 
137. Id. at art. V(4). 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/1
   
188 Pace Environmental Law Review [Vol. 35 
4. CMS legal instruments have the capacity to address 
threats and management concerns throughout the eel’s 
range, including in both freshwater and marine environ-
ments, as well as on the high seas;138 and 
5. CMS instruments can involve CMS Parties and non-Par-
ties.139 
CMS offers different options for a legal instrument to protect 
and conserve the European eel. Section A describes the principal 
options, while Section B assesses their similarities and differences. 
A. Legally Binding and Non-Legally Binding CMS 
Instruments 
CMS includes two provisions for developing new legal instru-
ments for species included in Appendix II. Article IV(3) refers to 
“AGREEMENTS,” while Article IV(4) refers to “agreements.” Collec-
tively, AGREEMENTS and agreements are referred to as “Agree-
ments” with an uppercase “A.”140 
Article IV(3) requires Parties that are Range States of migra-
tory species listed in Appendix II to endeavor to conclude 
“AGREEMENTS” where these should benefit the species. They 
should give priority to those species with an unfavorable conserva-
tion status.141 Article IV(4) encourages Parties to take action with 
a view to concluding “agreements” for any population or geograph-
ically separate part of the population of any species or lower taxon of 
wild animals, members of which periodically cross one or more na-
tional jurisdiction boundaries. 
AGREEMENTS and agreements differ in important ways. Un-
like AGREEMENTS, which expressly apply only to species included 
in Appendix II, agreements may include species not included in CMS 
 
138. Id. at art. V(2). 
139. Id.  
140. CMS Res 12.8, Implementation of Articles IV and V of the Convention, Doc. 
UNEP/CMS/Res. 12.8, at 1 (Oct. 2017), https://perma.cc/M635-8XRM (“Not-
ing that colloquially, and in this Resolution, the term ‘Agreements’ is used 
to refer in a generic sense to AGREEMENTS, agreements and Memoranda 
of Understanding as the context may require.”) (emphasis in original). 
141. Appendix II includes migratory species that (1) “have an unfavourable conser-
vation status and which require international agreements for their conserva-
tion and management”; and (2) those that “have a conservation status which 
would significantly benefit from the international co-operation that could be 
achieved by an international agreement.” CMS, supra note 18, at art. IV(1). 
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Appendix II. In addition, agreements may include species that are 
not migratory within the meaning of CMS. CMS defines “migratory 
species” to mean “the entire population or any geographically sepa-
rate part of the population of any species or lower taxon of wild ani-
mals, a significant proportion of whose members cyclically and pre-
dictably cross one or more national jurisdictional boundaries.”142 In 
contrast, species covered by an agreement need only “periodically 
cross one or more national jurisdictional boundaries.”143 In short, Ar-
ticle IV(4) covers a broader range of species than Article IV(3). A Eu-
ropean Eel Agreement could fall within either provision. 
CMS itself does not specify whether Article IV(3) 
AGREEMENTS and Article IV(4) agreements should be legally bind-
ing.144 Early in the Convention’s history, however, the Parties 
adopted resolutions that distinguished AGREEMENTS from agree-
ments. In 1988 in Resolution 2.6, for example, the Parties suggested 
that agreements could take the form of resolutions, administrative 
agreements, or memoranda of understanding.145 Because resolu-
tions of the Parties are non-binding, the implication was that agree-
ments under Article IV(4) could be, but were not required to be, non-
binding. The unstated corollary was that Article IV(3) 
AGREEMENTS would be legally binding. Resolution 2.6 further 
supports this interpretation by suggesting a progression; an agree-
ment under Article IV(4) could be a “first step” towards conclusion of 
an AGREEMENT under Article IV(3).146 A two-step process would 
 
142. Id. at art. I(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
143. Id. at art. IV(4) (emphasis added). 
144. For a review of the negotiating history concerning Articles IV(3) and (4), see 
Chris Wold, A History of “AGREEMENTS” under Article IV.3 and “agree-
ments” under Article IV.4 in the Convention on Migratory Species, Doc. 
UNEP/CMS/COP11/Inf.31 (Sept. 25, 2014), https://perma.cc/S44N-Y6NA. 
145. CMS Res. 2.6, Implementation of Articles IV and V of the Convention, Doc. 
UNEP/CMS/Res. 2.6, ¶ 3 (Oct. 14, 1988), https://perma.cc/9TLD-XSVT. The 
Parties consolidated Resolution 2.6 with other resolutions relating to imple-
mentation of Agreements in Resolution 12.8. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140.  
146. CMS Res. 2.6, supra note 145, ¶ 2. Later the Parties decided that agree-
ments could be a first step toward an AGREEMENT “in some cases” but that 
in other cases “this may not be appropriate.” CMS Res. 3.5, Implementation 
of Article IV, Paragraph 4, of the Convention Concerning AGREEMENTS, 
Doc. UNEP/CMS/Res. 3.5, ¶ 4 (Sept. 13, 1991), https://perma.cc/9YH8-
UR8E. The Parties consolidated Resolution 3.5 with other resolutions relat-
ing to implementation of Agreements in Resolution 12.8. CMS Res. 12.8, su-
pra note 140.  
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/1
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not be necessary unless the steps included some distinction in their 
legal status. 
Subsequently, CMS Parties, along with non-Parties in some 
cases, developed and brought into force seven legally binding Agree-
ments.147 Four of these Agreements were developed under Article 
IV(3),148 while the other three were developed under Article IV(4).149 
Each participating State consented to be bound by these Agreements 
only after engaging its domestic processes for ratifying or acceding to 
the Agreement, and the Agreement entered into force only after the 
requisite number of States ratified or acceded to the Agreement.150 
The Parties have also developed nineteen Memoranda of Under-
standing.151 Each of these agreements specifies that they were de-
veloped under Article IV(4) and are non-binding.152 Unlike legally 
 
147. Agreement on the Conservation of Gorillas and Their Habitats, Oct. 26, 2007, 
2545 U.N.T.S. 55 [hereinafter Gorilla Agreement]; Agreement on the Con-
servation of Albatrosses and Petrels, June 19, 2001, 2258 U.N.T.S. 257 (en-
tered into force Feb. 1, 2004) [hereinafter ACAP]; Agreement on African-
Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds, Aug. 15, 1996, 2365 U.N.T.S. 203 (entered 
into force Nov. 1, 1999) [hereinafter AEWA]; Agreement on the Conservation 
of Cetaceans of the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic 
Area, Nov. 24, 1996, 2183 U.N.T.S. 303 (entered into force June 1, 2001) 
[hereinafter ACCOBAMS]; [hereinafter EUROBATS]; Agreement on the 
Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas, Mar. 17, 
1992, 1772 U.N.T.S. 217 (entered into force Mar. 29, 1994) [hereinafter 
ASCOBANS]; Agreement on the Conservation of Bats in Europe, Dec. 4, 
1991, 1863 U.N.T.S. 101 (entered into force Jan. 16, 1994) [hereinafter 
EUROBATS]; Agreement on the Conservation of Seals in the Wadden Sea, 
Oct. 16, 1990, 2719 U.N.T.S. 263 (entered into force Oct. 1, 1991) [hereinaf-
ter Wadden Sea Seals]. 
148. See, e.g., ACAP, supra note 147, at art. I(5) (“This Agreement is an 
AGREEMENT within the meaning of Article IV (3) of the Convention[on 
Migratory Species].”); AEWA, supra note 147, at art. I(3) (“This Agreement 
is an AGREEMENT within the meaning of Article IV, paragraph 3, of the 
Convention [on Migratory Species].”). See also Gorilla Agreement, supra 
note 147, at art. I(4); EUROBATS, supra note 147, at art. II(1). 
149. ACCOBAMS, supra note 147, at art. I(4) (“This Agreement is an agreement 
within the meaning of Article IV, paragraph 4, of the Convention.”); 
ASCOBANS, supra note 147, at art. 8.1; Wadden Sea Seals, supra note 147, 
at art. I. 
150. See, e.g., ACAP, supra note 147, at arts. XV–XVI (describing the provisions 
for signature, ratification, accession, and entry into force). 
151. Links to all of these agreements can be found at Memoranda of Understand-
ing, CMS, https://perma.cc/3YFP-4DVR.  
152. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding for the Conservation of Cetaceans 
and Their Habitat in the Pacific Islands Region, Doc. UNEP/CMS/PIC-
1/Inf/3, ¶ 9 (opened for signature Sept. 15, 2006) (entered into force Sept. 15, 
2006), https://perma.cc/TG3P-2WJL [hereinafter Pacific Islands Cetaceans 
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binding Agreements, non-legally binding agreements do not need to 
go through a State’s ratification process. Instead, upon the signature 
of a designated individual, such as the Minister of Environment, a 
State becomes a “Signatory” to the MOU and agrees to implement it. 
B. Similarities and Differences 
Legally binding and non-legally binding CMS Agreements 
(that is, both AGREEMENTS and agreements) share many simi-
larities, but they also differ in important ways (aside from their 
legal status). The most important similarity is that they all include 
substantive conservation actions for Parties/Signatories to under-
take to protect the migratory species subject to the Agreement. In 
fact, the primary purpose of all Agreements is “to restore the mi-
gratory species concerned to a favourable conservation status or to 
maintain it in such a status.”153 Agreements frequently implement 
this goal through an Action Plan.154 These conservation provisions 
and Action Plans usually apply throughout the range of the con-
cerned species, including, where applicable, on the high seas. The 
Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels 
(“ACAP”), for example, applies to listed albatrosses and petrels 
throughout their range, which is defined as “all the areas of land 
or water that any albatross or petrel inhabits, stays in temporarily, 
crosses, or over-flies at any time on its normal migration routes.”155 
 
MOU] (“This Memorandum of Understanding is an agreement under Article 
IV, paragraph 4, of CMS and is not legally binding.”). 
153. CMS, supra note 18, at art. V(1) (for AGREEMENTS); CMS Res. 12.8, supra 
note 140, ¶ 3 (for agreements).  
154. See, e.g., ACAP, supra note 147, at annex 2(2) (establishing provisions for 
habitat conservation and restoration); Memorandum of Understanding on 
the Conservation and Management of Marine Turtles and their Habitats of 
the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia, at Conservation and Management 
Plan (opened for signature June 23, 2001) (entered into force Sept. 1, 2001), 
https://perma.cc/C2HK-MASE [hereinafter IOSEA Marine Turtles MOU]. 
155. ACAP, supra note 147, at arts. I(1), I(2)(i). Similarly, the Pacific Islands Ce-
taceans MOU applies to a signatory’s nationals and vessels, without geo-
graphic limit. Pacific Islands Cetaceans MOU, supra note 152, ¶ 11. Agree-
ments do not always cover the entire range of the species. AEWA, for 
example, does not cover the entire range of all waters it covers; it defines 
“waterbirds” to mean “those species of birds that are ecologically dependent 
on wetlands for at least part of their annual cycle, have a range which lies 
entirely or partly within the Agreement Area and are listed in Annex 2 to this 
Agreement.” AEWA, supra note 147, at art. I(2)(c) (emphasis added). 
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The application of an Agreement to the high seas, as with 
ACAP, is consistent with CMS, which provides that Agreements 
“should cover the whole of the range of the migratory species con-
cerned . . . .”156 CMS further defines “habitat” and “range” without 
reference to national jurisdiction,157 and defines “Range State” to 
include those State’s whose vessels “take”158 migratory species on 
the high seas.159 The conservation plan for ACAP, for example, in-
cludes provisions to protect land-based breeding sites of alba-
trosses and petrels,160 and the marine habitat of these species.161 
Similarly, the Memorandum of Understanding on the Conserva-
tion and Management of Marine Turtles and their Habitats of the 
Indian Ocean and South-East Asia (“IOSEA Marine Turtles 
MOU”) calls on Signatories to manage and regulate beaches where 
sea turtles nest162 and to take action to protect high seas turtle 
habitat.163 
Most, if not all, Agreements, regardless of whether they are 
legally binding or not, also include the following provisions: 
• Submission of reports by Parties/Signatories on imple-
mentation of the Agreement;164 
 
156. CMS, supra note 18, at art. V(2) (for AGREEMENTS); CMS Res. 12.8, supra 
note 140, ¶ 4 (for agreements). 
157. CMS, supra note 18, at art. I(1)(f)–(g). 
158. CMS defines “taking” to mean “taking, hunting, fishing, capturing, harassing, 
deliberate killing, or attempting to engage in any such conduct.” Id. at art. 
I(1)(i).  
159. CMS defines “Range State” as follows: 
“Range State” in relation to a particular migratory species means any 
State (and where appropriate any other Party referred to under sub-
paragraph (k) of this paragraph) that exercises jurisdiction over any 
part of the range of that migratory species, or a State, flag vessels of 
which are engaged outside national jurisdictional limits in taking that 
migratory species. 
Id. at art. I(1)(h). 
160. ACAP, supra note 147, at annex 2, ¶ 2.2.1. 
161. Id. at annex 2, ¶ 2.3. 
162. IOSEA Martine Turtles MOU, supra note 154, at Conservation and Man-
agement Plan, Objective 2. 
163. Id. at Conservation and Management Plan, Objectives 1.4, 5.3. 
164. See, e.g., AEWA, supra note 147, at art. IV(1)(c); ACCOBAMS, supra note 
147, at art. VIII(b); IOSEA Marine Turtles MOU, supra note 154, at “Ac-
tions,” ¶ 8; Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation of Migra-
tory Sharks, Doc. CMS/Sharks/MOS1/Inf.1, ¶ 15(b) (opened for signature 
Feb. 12, 2010), (entered into force Mar. 2010)https://perma.cc/3Q24-LXUJ 
[hereinafter Sharks MOU]. 
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• Review by the Parties/Signatories of implementation at 
meetings of participating States;165 
• Establishment or designation of a Secretariat to organize 
meetings and undertake other administrative services;166 
• Financial arrangements for the Agreement;167 
• A grant of authority to the Parties to a legally binding 
Agreement or Signatories to a non-legally binding agree-
ment to interpret the Agreement by adopting resolutions 
and, where relevant, add new species to the list of covered 
species;168 and 
• Establishment of a scientific or technical committee to 
provide relevant scientific or other information and advice 
to the Agreement’s decision-making body,169 although 
they may be designed differently depending on the needs 
of the Agreement.170 
 
165. See, e.g., AEWA, supra note 147, at art. VI(8)(b); ACCOBAMS, supra note 
147, at art. III(8)(b); IOSEA Marine Turtles MOU, supra note 154, at “Basic 
Principles,” ¶ 3; Sharks MOU, supra note 164, ¶ 20. 
166. See, e.g., AEWA, supra note 147, at art. VI(7)(b); ACCOBAMS, supra note 
147, at art. IV(1)–(2); IOSEA Martine Turtles MOU, supra note 147, at “Ac-
tions,” ¶ 5; Sharks MOU, supra note 163, ¶ 27(a). 
167. See, e.g., AEWA, supra note 147, at art. VI(8)(c); ACCOBAMS, supra note 
147, at art. III(8)(e); IOSEA Marine Turtles MOU, supra note 154, at “Ac-
tions,” ¶ 9; Sharks MOU, supra note 164, ¶¶ 16–17. 
168. See, e.g., ACAP, supra note 147, at art. VIII(13)(c), (e); AEWA, supra note 
147, at art. VI(9); ACCOBAMS, supra note 147, at art. VII(3)(b)–(c); IOSEA 
Marine Turtles MOU, supra note 154, at “Actions,” ¶¶ 3–4; Sharks MOU, 
supra note 164, ¶¶ 20, 33. 
169. See, e.g., ACAP, supra note 147, at arts. IX(1), (6)(a)–(c); ACCOBAMS, supra 
note 147, at arts. III(8)(c), VII; IOSEA Marine Turtles MOU, supra note 154, 
at “Actions,” ¶ 6; Sharks MOU, supra note 164, ¶ 24. 
170. See, e.g., Gorilla Agreement, supra note 147, at art. VI (establishing a Tech-
nical Committee); ACAP, supra note 147, at art. IX(1) (establishing an Ad-
visory Committee); AEWA supra note 147, at art. VII(3) (establishing a 
Technical Committee); ACCOBAMS, supra note 147, at art. VII(1) (estab-
lishing a Scientific Committee); ASCOBANS, supra note 147, at art. 5.1 (es-
tablishing an Advisory Committee). However, some MOUs, particularly the 
earlier ones, receive scientific advice from the CMS Scientific Council. Mem-
orandum of Understanding concerning Conservation Measures for the East-
ern Atlantic Populations of the Mediterranean Monk Seal (Monachus mon-
achus), ¶ 4 (Oct. 18, 2007), https://perma.cc/S4RA-3B9N [hereinafter 
Mediterranean Monk Seal MOU] (nominating the Atlantic Seal Working 
Group); Memorandum of Understanding concerning Conservation Measures 
for the West African Populations of the African Elephant (Loxodonta afri-
cana), ¶ 4 (Nov. 22, 2005), https://perma.cc/Q75T-GD7B [hereinafter West 
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Despite these numerous similarities, key differences exist. Le-
gally binding Agreements, whether established under Article IV(3) 
or IV(4), take longer to enter into force because of the need to en-
gage a State’s domestic legal processes for ratification or accession. 
ACAP took more than two-and-a-half years to enter into force,171 
the African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbird Agreement (“AEWA”) 
more than three years,172 and the Agreement on the Conservation 
of Cetaceans of the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous 
Atlantic Area (“ACCOBAMS”) roughly 4.5 years.173 
In contrast, MOUs typically commence more quickly. Even ge-
ographically large, marine MOUs commenced on the day that they 
opened for signature. The Memorandum of Understanding on the 
Conservation of Migratory Sharks (“Sharks MOU”), for example, 
obtained the 10 signatories needed to operationalize the MOU on 
the same day it opened for signature,174 as did the Memorandum 
of Understanding for the Conservation of Cetaceans and their Hab-
itats in the Pacific Island Region (“Pacific Cetaceans MOU”).175 
The legally binding Agreements also tend to have their own 
Secretariats, although this is not universal. ACCOBAMS, Wadden 
Sea Seals, and ACAP each have a fully independent Secretariat 
with offices separate from the CMS Secretariat in Bonn.176 AEWA 
and the Agreement on the Conservation of Populations of Euro-
pean Bats (“EUROBATS”) have largely independent Secretariats, 
 
African Elephants MOU] (nominating the IUCN African Elephant Special-
ist Group). 
171. ACAP was opened for signature on June 19, 2001, and entered into force on 
February 1, 2004. ACAP, CMS, https://perma.cc/4S5D-WWDY.  
172. AEWA was opened for signature on August 15, 1996, and entered into force 
on November 1, 1999. AEWA, CMS, https://perma.cc/HTC8-CVJ6.  
173. ACCOBAMS was signed on November 24, 1996, and entered in force on June 
1, 2001. ACCOBAMS, CMS, https://perma.cc/BCS6-YXKM.  
174. The Sharks MOU entered into force 30 days after receiving the requisite 10 
signatures. See Sharks MOU, supra note 164, at 9. 
175. The Pacific Islands Cetaceans MOU required four signatories to commence; 
seven signed on the first day. Pacific Cetaceans MOU, supra note 152, ¶ 12.  
176. Robert Lee et al., Review of the Current Organization and Activities of CMS 
and the CMS Family 
First Step of the Inter-Sessional Future Shape Process, Doc. 
UNEP/CMS/Inf.10.14.8, ¶ 16 (Jan. 1, 2010), https://perma.cc/AU9E-SJH2. 
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but they are housed with the CMS Secretariat and share some ad-
ministrative and other tasks.177 The Secretariat of the Agreement 
on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic, North East 
Atlantic, Irish and North Seas (“ASCOBANS”) has been subsumed 
within the CMS Secretariat, and the CMS Secretariat is also the 
Secretariat for the Agreement on the Conservation of Gorillas and 
Their Habitats (“Gorilla Agreement”).178 AEWA, ASCOBANS, 
EUROBATS, and the Gorilla Agreement are integrated within 
United Nations Environment (formerly known as the United Na-
tions Environment Programme).179 
Many of the MOUs are administered by the CMS Secretariat, 
and none has an independent secretariat. In some cases, however, 
the CMS Secretariat receives support for technical coordination 
services from a nongovernmental organization.180 In two cases 
(Ruddy-headed Goose and Huemel MOUs), the two Signatories 
(Argentina and Chile) coordinate among themselves; they function 
independently of the CMS Secretariat.181 The Signatories to three 
other MOUs (Monk Seal, Grassland Birds, and High Andean Fla-
mingos) perform most of the coordination work and operate “rela-
tively independently” of the Secretariat.182 Each of these three 
MOUs has just four or five Signatories, making coordination rela-
tively simple compared to Agreements with many more Parties or 
Signatories. 
CMS Agreements also differ in the number of working lan-
guages that they use. ACCOBAMS works in English and 
 
177. CMS, Report of Resolution 11.3, Enhancing Synergies and Sharing Common 
Services among CMS Family Instruments, UNEP/CMS/COP12/Doc.16.1 
(2017), https://perma.cc/KHM6-YL4N.  
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. The Saiga Antelope, Siberian Crane, Aquatic Warbler, and Pacific Ceta-
ceans MOUs receive technical coordination services from NGOs. CMS, An 
Assessment of MOUs and Their Viability, Doc. 
UNEP/CMS/COP11/Doc.22.3, at 21 (Aug. 14, 2014), https://perma.cc/579J-
TYTM [hereinafter CMS Assessment of MOUs]. 
181. Id. at 22. 
182. Id. at 23. 
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French;183 ASCOBANS works primarily in English, but also pro-
vides translations of some documents in other languages;184 AEWA 
works in two languages (French and English);185 ACAP in three 
(French, English, and Spanish); and EUROBATS in one (Eng-
lish).186 Similarly, MOUs differ in the number of languages used. 
For example, the Sharks MOU uses three (English, Spanish, and 
French),187 while the Pacific Cetaceans MOU uses two (English 
and French).188 The IOSEA Marine Turtles and Dugong MOUs use 
only English.189 
Importantly, the number of working languages chosen and the 
choice of administrative structures for locating and hosting a Sec-
retariat are not dependent on whether an Agreement is binding. 
These are negotiable items. That said, the costs of operating an 
Agreement rise substantially with the number of working lan-
guages due to the need for interpretation and translation. 
C. Conservation Outcomes of Legally Binding and 
Non-Legally Binding Agreements 
In 2008, the CMS Secretariat undertook an analysis of the 19 
MOUs and the Gorilla Agreement to determine which factors led 
 
183. ACCOBAMS, RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE MEETING OF THE PARTIES at Rule 
21(1), https://perma.cc/5STK-D97Q.  
184. See, e.g., Eighth Meeting of the Parties, ASCOBANS, https://perma.cc/55LT-
6AMB (showing meeting documents only in English). The treaty provides 
that English, French, German, and Russian are equally authentic, but, as 
noted, the parties only conduct meetings in one language. ASCOBANS, su-
pra note 147, at art. 8.7. 
185. See 6th Session of the Meeting of the Parties to AEWA, AEWA, 
https://perma.cc/T2SS-CKJT (showing translation of meeting documents 
into English and French only). AEWA has four official languages, however: 
Arabic, English, French, and Russian. AEWA, supra note 147, at art. 
XVII(1). 
186. EUROBATS, RULES OF PROCEDURE at Rule 17, https://perma.cc/396S-
TPWN.  
187. Sharks MOU, supra note 164, ¶ 34. 
188. Pacific Cetaceans MOU, supra note 152, ¶ 16. 
189. Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation and Management of 
Dugongs (Dugong dugon) and Their Habitats throughout Their Range, Doc. 
CMS/DUGONG/Inf.5, ¶ 19 (Oct. 31, 2007), https://perma.cc/3A6H-BLS5 
[hereinafter Dugong MOU]; IOSEA Marine Turtles MOU, Doc. CMS/MT-
AFR.1/Inf.7, at 5 (June 23, 2001), https://perma.cc/VL43-8GZR.   
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to successful performance of MOUs.190 The Secretariat concluded 
that MOUs were more likely to be viable when: 
• the Signatories are willing and able to run it themselves 
(the number of Signatories must be small); 
• there is a strong engagement from the stakeholders in the 
MOU and some modest and regular funding to assist 
them; or 
• significant funding to staff a functional Secretariat is 
available.191 
The second point—the active engagement of one of more non-
State actors—appears particularly relevant to the success of an 
MOU. The CMS Secretariat concluded: 
The total number of stakeholders is . . . not the important factor. 
As for the case of Saiga Antelope, the Aquatic Warbler and IOSEA, 
the total number of stakeholders is rather low, but all of them are 
actively engaged and participate in the MOU, suggesting the MOU 
is central to the wider conservation effort.192 
Later in its assessment, the Secretariat concluded: 
[W]ith the Bukhara Deer MOU, there has been little engagement 
from the Secretariat over the years, but one committed NGO 
(WWF Russia) uses the MOU and its Action Plan to engage with 
the relevant governments in existing fora, and ensures conserva-
tion actions are being implemented.193 
Perhaps surprisingly, the legal status of the Agreement “does 
not appear to be a matter of great significance.”194 Consistent with 
the Secretariat’s conclusions, the authors of a paper that reviewed 
implementation of CMS Agreements concluded that stable, core 
funding is more important.195 Those CMS Agreements with stable, 
 
190. See generally CMS Assessment of MOUs, supra note 180. The Parties asked 
for the analysis in CMS Res. 10.09, Future Structure and Strategies of 
the CMS and CMS Family, Doc. UNEP/CMS/Res. 10.09, annex 1, at Ac-
tivity 5 (Nov. 20–25, 2011), https://perma.cc/96DK-JCC2. 
191. CMS Assessment of MOUs, supra note 180, at 39. 
192. Id. at 31. 
193. Id. at 36. 
194. Lee et al., supra note 176, ¶ 255.  
195. Id. 
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core funding are able to pursue their conservation agenda confi-
dently, unlike MOUs relying “exclusively on voluntary contribu-
tions that could be withdrawn or not materialize at any time.”196 
Despite this conclusion, legally binding Agreements appear to 
provide more stable funding because they have their own core 
budgets; Parties perhaps view their contributions to legally bind-
ing Agreements differently from their contributions to MOUs, 
which are specified as “voluntary.”197 
V. SHOULD CMS PURSUE A CMS LEGAL 
INSTRUMENT FOR EELS? 
Despite the Convention’s provisions for the development of 
Agreements, the CMS Parties have evolved their thinking about 
their value. In 2008, the CMS Parties noted the challenges associ-
ated with the proliferation of CMS Agreements, in particular the 
financial and staff resources needed to administer and operation-
alize them effectively.198 Consequently, the Parties adopted crite-
ria for evaluating proposals for new Agreements at the Eleventh 
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties (“COP”).199 When evalu-
ating proposals for future Agreements, the CMS Secretariat and 
 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at annex I, tbl.35. 
198. CMS Res. 9.13, Intersessional Process Regarding the Future Shape of CMS, 
UNEP/CMS/Res. 9.13, preamble para. 9 (Dec. 1–8, 2008) (acknowledging 
that the growth in Agreements creates “new challenges” for CMS that re-
quires “in-depth consideration”), https://perma.cc/P63W-LH7J. See also 
CMS Res. 10.16, Priorities for CMS Agreements, Doc. UNEP/CMS/Res. 
10.16, ¶ 6 (Nov. 20–25, 2011), https://perma.cc/5D4K-CCDX (recognizing 
that the “development and servicing of agreements are subject to the avail-
ability of resources”). The Parties repealed these two resolutions in 2017 be-
cause the work outlined in them had been completed. See CMS, Review of 
Decisions, Doc. UNEP/CMS/COP12/Doc.21/Rev.2, annex 2, at 22–24 (Aug. 
10, 2017), https://perma.cc/7RRJ-R66K [hereinafter CMS Review of Deci-
sions]. 
199. See generally CMS Res. 11.12, Criteria for Assessing Proposals for New 
Agreements, Doc. UNEP/CMS/Res. 11.12 (Nov. 4–9, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/8KUJ-L5JH. The criteria, originally adopted in Resolution 
11.12, were incorporated into Resolution 12.8; Resolution 11.12 was then 
repealed. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, ¶ 13(d). The original instruction 
derives from Resolution 10.9, which called for the creation of “criteria 
against which to assess proposed new potential agreements.” CMS Res. 10.9, 
supra note 190, at annex 1, at Activity 12. See also UNEP Res. 10.16, supra 
note 198, ¶ 6 (including eight considerations to be addressed when making 
any new proposals for Agreements). The Parties repealed this resolution in 
31
  
2018] Bringing the European Eel Back from the Brink 199 
Scientific Council are “instruct[ed]” and the CMS Parties are 
“urg[ed]” to apply criteria such as identifying the relevant species’ 
conservation needs and the possibility for stable funding.200 These 
criteria are designed to assess the “opportunities, risks, appropri-
ateness and relative priority” of any new proposal for a new CMS 
legal instrument.201 
1.   Conservation priority. The conservation priority criterion 
requires an assessment of the severity of the conservation need “in 
relation to the degree of species endangerment or unfavourable 
conservation status as defined under the Convention.”202 As noted 
above, the European eel is categorized as “Critically Endangered” 
under the IUCN Red List, with glass eel recruitment reaching as 
low as 1% of pre-1980 abundance in some localities.203 In addition, 
the European eel’s status is clearly “unfavourable,” as defined by 
CMS.204 With recruitment at a historic low, the species is unlikely 
 
2017 because it was superseded by subsequent resolutions. See CMS Review 
of Decisions, supra note 198, at annex 2, at 23–24. 
200. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, ¶ 8.  
201. Id. at annex, at 4. A paper prepared for the First Range States Workshop on 
the European Eel and the Report of that workshop summarized those crite-
ria and apply those criteria to the European eel. Otto Spijkers & Alex O. 
Elferink, Potential for A New CMS Agreement on the European Eel, Doc. 
UNEP/CMS/Eels WS1/Doc. 3, at 12-13 (Oct. 13–14, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/P3N8-8NE9; Rep. of the First Range States Workshop on 
the European Eel, supra note 24, ¶ 113 (This article looks at those criteria 
in more detail in the context of a potential European Eel Agreement, while 
acknowledging that some elements cannot be assessed until a proposal is 
more fully developed.). 
202. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (i). 
203. JACOBY & GOLLOCK , supra note 16, at 6.  
204. Under CMS Article I, a species’ conservation status is considered “unfavour-
able” if any of the following criteria are not met: 
(1)  population dynamics data indicate that the migratory species is 
maintaining itself on a long-term basis as a viable component of 
its ecosystems; 
(2)  the range of the migratory species is neither currently being re-
duced, nor is likely to be reduced, on a long-term basis; 
(3)  there is, and will be in the foreseeable future sufficient habitat to 
maintain the population of the migratory species on a long-term 
basis; and 
(4)  the distribution and abundance of the migratory species approach 
historic coverage and levels to the extent that potentially suitable 
ecosystems exist and to the extent consistent with wise wildlife 
management[.] 
CMS, supra note 18, at art. I(1)(c)–(d). 
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to maintain itself on a long-term basis without appropriate interven-
tions. With large dams blocking migration and many more dams pro-
posed in eel habitat,205 the eel’s range is currently being reduced and 
likely will continue to be reduced on a long-term basis. 
2.    Serve a specific existing COP mandate. This criterion spec-
ifies that any new agreement respond to an expressed CMS strat-
egy or other decision of the Parties.206 A new CMS legal instrument 
to protect the European eel could help fulfill Goal 3 of the CMS 
Strategic Plan, which calls for “improv[ing] the conservation status 
of migratory species and the ecological connectivity and resilience 
of their habitats.”207 Protecting near-shore and freshwater habi-
tats across the species’ range would improve connectivity and re-
silience for the European eel because the European eel only occurs 
in water bodies that are connected to the sea under natural condi-
tions.208 Moreover, if Range States and territories can be brought 
together to benefit the European eel, then Goal 5—to “[e]nhance 
implementation through participatory planning, knowledge man-
agement and capacity building”209—would also be fulfilled. 
Other CMS policies and strategies would also be addressed. 
For example, Resolution 11.27 urges Parties to “undertake 
measures to reduce or mitigate known serious impacts” on fresh-
water species from hydropower by, among other things, creating 
fish ladders.210 Any strategy to protect eels would most probably 
include provisions relating to restoring habitat above dams and re-
moving obstacles to migration caused by hydroelectric and other 
dams. Lastly, because Article IV of the CMS directs CMS Parties 
to endeavor to conclude an agreement for Appendix II species,211 
 
205. See supra Section II.C.2. 
206. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (ii). 
207. CMS Res. 11.2, Strategic Plan for Migratory Species 2015–2023, 
UNEP/CMS/Res. 11.2, annex 1, Chapter 3, Goal 3 (Nov. 9, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/Y7PJ-47XT. 
208. CMS, Proposal for the Inclusion of the European Eel (Anguilla anguilla) on 
CMS Appendix II, Doc. UNEP/CMS/COP11/Doc.24.1.18, at 8 (Sep. 12, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/TJL2-QAZ3. 
209. CMS Res. 11.2, supra note 207, at annex I, at Chapter 3, Goal 5. 
210. CMS Res. 11.27, Renewable Energy and Migratory Species, Doc. 
UNEP/CMS/Res. 11.27 (Rev. COP12), ¶ 3(d) (2017), https://perma.cc/ALN6-
57EN. 
211. Article IV(3) provides that “Parties that are Range States of migratory species 
listed in Appendix II shall endeavour to conclude AGREEMENTS where these 
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the preparation of a new legal instrument for the European eel, 
already included in Appendix II, would fulfill an expressed CMS 
strategy. 
3.   Clear and specific defined purpose. This criterion calls on 
any proposal for a new CMS legal instrument to specify the in-
tended conservation outcomes and ways that the target species 
would benefit from international cooperation.212 As with other 
CMS Agreements, the overall goal would be to restore the Euro-
pean eel to a favorable conservation status, consistent with CMS 
Article V. More specifically, a so-called “European Eel Agreement” 
could include, among other things, the following specific purposes 
to improve the conservation status of the European eel: 
• To coordinate conservation goals and strategies through-
out the range of the European eel. Currently, EU Member 
States have established a goal of 40% escapement of silver 
eels,213 and Member States must develop EMPs for each 
river basin inhabited by eels.214 Nineteen Member States 
have developed EMPs to accomplish those goals.215 The 
First Range States Workshop on the European Eel indi-
cates that an escapement goal of 40% would be a key ele-
ment of a future CMS Agreement.216 To ensure compati-
bility with EMPs developed by EU Range States, such a 
goal would seem highly pragmatic—at least until a differ-
ent range-wide goal could be agreed to within the context 
of a European Eel Agreement, based on the available sci-
entific information. 
 
should benefit the species and should give priority to those species in an unfa-
vourable conservation status.” CMS, supra note 18, at art. IV(3). 
212. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (iii). 
213. EU Eel Regulation, supra note 13, at art. 2(4). The provision provides in full: 
The objective of each Eel Management Plan shall be to reduce anthro-
pogenic mortalities so as to permit with high probability the escape-
ment to the sea of at least 40% of the silver eel biomass relative to the 
best estimate of escapement that would have existed if no anthropo-
genic influences had impacted the stock. The Eel Management Plan 
shall be prepared with the purpose of achieving this objective in the 
long term. 
Id. 
214. Id. at arts. 2(1), (3). 
215. Eel Implementation Report, supra note 105, at 4. 
216. Rep. of the First Range States Workshop on the European Eel, supra note 
24, at 28. 
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• To develop and coordinate scientific research relating to 
the European eel across its geographic range. As noted 
above, scientists agree that much is unknown about the 
European eel and the causes of its decline.217 
• To ensure stakeholder participation in eel conservation. 
The participation of stakeholders in the development of 
eel conservation plans has been described as “marginal” 
and “varied.”218 A CMS legal instrument could ensure 
stakeholder participation. 
Section VI of this Article describes a number of other provi-
sions that could be included in a European Eel Agreement. 
4.   Absence of better remedies outside the CMS system.219 Al-
ternatives to a CMS legal instrument all fall short of addressing 
all threats to the European eel throughout the eel’s range. As noted 
in Section III, RFMOs do not have the geographic or management 
authority to manage eels. Other treaties focus on only one aspect 
of eel conservation (for example, international trade under CITES). 
In addition, other multilateral environmental agreements 
(“MEAs”), such as the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(“CBD”)220 or the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(“UNCLOS”),221 may provide general conservation duties but are 
not designed to manage specific species.222 Only CMS has the au-
thority to cover freshwater and marine habitat (including areas of 
the high seas) and the full range of threats to the European eel. 
5.    Absence of better remedies inside the CMS system.223 CMS 
offers alternatives to a new legal instrument, such as “concerted 
actions” or “action plans,” but these are not likely to be better rem-
edies. Concerted actions are “priority conservation measures, pro-
jects, or institutional arrangements undertaken to improve the 
 
217. See supra Sections II.B and II.C. 
218. Dekker, supra note 20, at 2445, 2447. 
219. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (iv). 
220. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S 79 (entered 
into force Dec. 29, 1993), https://perma.cc/726C-CK3E [hereinafter CBD]. 
221. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S 3 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994), https://perma.cc/K4JD-2LTX 
[hereinafter UNCLOS].   
222. For more information on the inability of existing treaties to manage the full 
range of threats to the European eel, see generally Spijkers & Elferink, su-
pra note 201, at 5–11. 
223. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (v). 
35
  
2018] Bringing the European Eel Back from the Brink 203 
conservation status of selected Appendix I and Appendix II species 
or selected groups of Appendix I and Appendix II species” that 1) 
“involve measures that are the collective responsibility of Parties 
acting in concert,” or 2) are “designed to support the conclusion of 
an instrument under Article IV of the Convention and enable con-
servation measures to be progressed in the meantime or represent 
an alternative to such an instrument.”224 In the past, the Parties 
listed species for which concerted actions should be taken, but they 
did not identify any specific conservation actions to take.225 In-
stead, each Party was free to determine what action it would take. 
The concept of concerted actions has evolved; they now include 
specific proposals that identify conservation actions to be under-
taken by specified entities (e.g., Parties, Secretariat).226 Such con-
certed actions, as with action plans, apply only to CMS Parties that 
are Range States. Thus, if either is adopted for the European eel, 
it would not apply to non-Parties such as Iceland, Turkey, and the 
Faroe Islands. While these non-Parties could participate infor-
mally in a concerted action, it is difficult to conceive, in most cir-
cumstances, how that would occur. For example, the Parties have 
not called intersessional meetings to discuss implementation of the 
concerted actions and, prior to COP12 in 2017, concerted actions 
have not been publicized on the CMS website.227 Consequently, a 
non-Party is unlikely to know that a concerted action has been 
adopted. Intersessional meetings have occurred for some actions 
plans, but they are rare and entirely dependent on voluntary con-
tributions. With a CMS Agreement, the Agreement itself will spec-
ify the meeting schedule.228 
 
224. CMS Res. 12.28, supra note 27, ¶ 1. 
225. Prior to COP11, concerted actions applied to Appendix I species and cooper-
ative actions applied to Appendix II species. While two different names ap-
plied, the process for identifying species and the outcome (a list) was the 
same. CMS Res. 11.13, Concerted and Cooperative Actions, Doc. 
UNEP/CMS/Resolution 11.13 (Nov. 4–9, 2014), https://perma.cc/VJN8-
KPJN. CMS Res. 11.13 was repealed by CMS Res. 12.28, supra note 24, ¶ 9. 
226. See, e.g., CMS, Proposal for a Concerted Action for the Arabian Sea Hump-
back Whale (Megaptera novaeangliae), Doc. UNEP/CMS/COP12/Doc. 26.2.4, 
at 4 (June 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/PH4H-672A. 
227. Personal Communication with Melanie Virtue, Head, Aquatic Species Team, 
CMS Secretariat (May 23, 2018). 
228. Id. 
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6.   If a CMS instrument is best, extending an existing one is 
not feasible.229 None of the existing CMS Agreements relates in 
any way to the conservation of the European eel. Several existing 
Agreements protect bird species (AEWA, ACAP, Memorandum of 
Understanding on the Conservation of Migratory Birds of Prey in 
Africa and Eurasia (“Raptors MOU”)), while others are terrestrial-
mammal focused (EUROBATS, West African Elephants MOU). 
Those that involve marine species are focused on specific taxo-
nomic groups (ACCOBAMS, ASCOBANS, IOSEA Turtle MOU, 
Dugongs MOU, Sharks MOU). Aside from the Sharks MOU, no 
other Agreement addresses fish species or fish conservation. 
7.    Prospects for funding. As noted above,230 adequate and 
predictable financing is a key component driving the success of a 
CMS Agreement. Although beyond the scope of this Article, identi-
fying prospects for funding is also a criterion for evaluating pro-
posals for new CMS Agreements.231 However, given the value of 
the European eel as food and bait and the dire conservation status 
of the species, the prospects for funding would seem promising. 
That said, conservation need and funding do not always align. 
CMS itself provides good examples. Despite the continuing decline 
of the African elephant in West Africa, the Memorandum of Un-
derstanding concerning Conservation Measures for the West Afri-
can Populations of the African Elephant (Loxodonta africana) re-
mains mostly unfunded.232 With respect to funding a European Eel 
Agreement, the EU—with 27 of 28 Member States (all but Hun-
gary) included as Range States of the European eel233—might be a 
place to start.234 
8.    Synergies and cost-effectiveness.235 A CMS Agreement for 
European eels that includes actions to protect the Sargasso Sea 
will have significant synergistic effects with other CMS initiatives. 
As described in the designation of the Sargasso Sea as an Ecologi-
cally or Biologically Significant Marine Area (“EBSA”) under the 
 
229. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (vi). 
230. See supra Section IV.C. 
231. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (vii). 
232. CMS Assessment of MOUs, supra note 180, at 37. 
233. JACOBY & GOLLOCK , supra note 16, at 4. 
234. See Spijkers & Elferink, supra note 201, at 15 (identifying the EU as a po-
tential funder). 
235. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (viii). 
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CBD,236 the Sargasso Sea is home to several species of shark and 
cetaceans that are the subject of other CMS legal instruments and 
resolutions, including the Sharks MOU237 and the Global Pro-
gramme of Work for Cetaceans.238 Other species included in the 
CMS Appendices, including the green turtle (Chelonia mydas), 
hawksbill turtle (Eretmochelys imbricate), loggerhead turtle 
(Caretta caretta), and Kemp’s ridley turtle (Lepidochelys kempii), 
all of which are included in both Appendix I and II, use Sargassum 
as a nursery habitat.239 Adult leatherback sea turtles (Dermo-
chelys coriacea) also use the Sargasso Sea.240 
Moreover, any measure to protect the European eel in its 
freshwater habitat will also benefit the freshwater fish species in-
cluded in the Appendices and, thus, help implement Resolution 
10.12 on migratory freshwater fish. That resolution specifically 
calls on Parties “to strengthen measures to protect migratory 
freshwater fish species against threats, including habitat destruc-
tion, habitat fragmentation, overfishing, bycatch, invasive species, 
pollution and barriers to migration.”241 
Because the European eel is adversely affected by habitat loss 
and degradation, barriers to migration, and overexploitation, a 
CMS Agreement for the species would also help the Parties imple-
ment paragraph 6 of Resolution 10.12, which calls on Parties to: 
[E]ngage in international cooperation on migratory freshwater 
fish, which would focus on CMS-listed fish species, at sub-regional 
or regional levels, noting that this cooperation should, inter 
alia[,] . . . . b) identify and implement effective measures, as appro-
priate, to mitigate threats such as habitat degradation, barriers to 
migration, bycatch and overexploitation[.]242 
 
236. Ecologically or Biologically Significant Areas (EBSAs): The Sargasso Sea, 
CBD (June 15, 2015), https://perma.cc/BK2A-K63M. 
237. See generally Sharks MOU, supra note 164.  
238. See generally CMS Res. 10.15, Global Programme of Work for Cetaceans, 
Doc. UNEP/CMS/Resolution 10.15 (Oct. 2017), https://perma.cc/Y3BV-68SZ. 
239. Ecologically or Biologically Significant Areas (EBSAs): The Sargasso Sea, 
supra note 236. 
240. Id. 
241. CMS Res. 10.12,  Freshwater Migratory Species, Doc. UNEP/CMS/Resolutio- 
n 10.12, ¶ 2 (Nov. 20–25, 2011), https://perma.cc/5HHJ-LS3R. 
242. Id. ¶ 6(b). 
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Any measures to reduce habitat loss and degradation, barriers 
to migration, and overexploitation are likely to benefit not only the 
many freshwater migratory species included in the CMS Appen-
dices but other species as well. Because reports indicate that 38% 
of European freshwater fish are threatened,243 measures to protect 
the European eel could have significant conservation benefits for 
many of these species as well. 
With respect to cost-effectiveness, proposals should identify 
the resources needed to implement the new CMS Agreement. The 
exact scale of the resources needed to administer a European Eel 
Agreement is difficult to predict because no current CMS Agree-
ment has the same combination of number of species (1), number 
of Range States and territories (57), range of threats, and geo-
graphic scope covering freshwater and marine habitats, as well as 
jurisdictional waters and areas beyond national jurisdiction. The 
potential costs of a European Eel Agreement are discussed in more 
detail in Section VI.H. Whether such an Agreement would be cost-
effective will be a subjective inquiry in light of the time lag for any 
conservation benefits to be achieved. 
9.   Prospects for leadership in developing an Agreement.244 A 
highly committed leader, whether a government or nongovernmen-
tal organization, can help ensure the successful development and 
implementation of a CMS Agreement. In a report concerning the 
viability of CMS MOUs, the CMS Secretariat noted the following: 
   For some avian and marine mammal MOUs, having one highly 
committed partner, which feels a genuine sense of partnership 
may be sufficient to ensure a good degree of implementation; Bird-
Life International and Whale and Dolphin Conservation (WDC) 
are examples of this. Similarly with the Bukhara Deer MOU, there 
has been little engagement from the Secretariat over the years, 
but one committed NGO (WWF Russia) uses the MOU and its Ac-
tion Plan to engage with the relevant governments in existing fora, 
and ensures conservation actions are being implemented. 
  Conversely, the lack of any suitable stakeholders to assist with 
implementation can cause significant problems. This is particu-
larly the case on the west coast of Africa, where the Secretariat 
 
243. CMS, Executive Summary: Review of Freshwater Fish, Doc. 
UNEP/CMS/Conf.10.32, ¶ 1 (Sept. 28 2011), https://perma.cc/RSA6-CQQQ. 
244. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (ix). 
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has been unable to identify a suitable NGO or other partner to as-
sist with the implementation of the three MOUs there.245 
The prospects for leadership in developing and implementing 
a CMS Agreement for European eels appear to be very strong. The 
Sargasso Sea Commission246 has taken an active role in protecting 
not only the Sargasso Sea but also species that depend on it. This 
independent Commission is appointed by the Government of Ber-
muda, pursuant to the provisions of the 2014 Hamilton Declaration 
on Collaboration for the Conservation of the Sargasso Sea,247 a po-
litical declaration now signed by nine governments.248 The Com-
mission’s mission, supported by the government Signatories and a 
number of collaborating partners from the science and conserva-
tion world,249 is to “[e]xercise a stewardship role for the Sargasso 
Sea and keep its health, productivity and resilience under contin-
ual review.”250 The Sargasso Sea Commission helped organize the 
First Range States Workshop on the European Eel,251 is organizing 
the second Range States workshop,252 and appears fully committed 
to ensuring the implementation of any CMS European Eel Agree-
ment. It also developed the proposal that led to the establishment 
of the Sargasso Sea as an EBSA, helped motivate the proposal to 
 
245. CMS Assessment of MOUs, supra note 180, at 36. 
246. About the Commission, SARGASSO SEA COMM’N, https://perma.cc/QL96-
6BFH. More details about the history of the Sargasso Sea Commission can 
be found at David Freestone & Kate Killerlain Morrison, Current Legal De-
velopments: The Sargasso Sea, 27 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 345 (2012), 
https://perma.cc/8CYB-VJYX, and David Freestone & Faith Bulger, The 
Sargasso Sea Commission: An Innovative Approach to the Conservation of 
Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, 30 OCEAN Y.B. 80 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/38M2-NHP3.  
247. Hamilton Declaration on Collaboration for the Conservation of the Sargasso 
Sea, Mar. 11, 2014, https://perma.cc/48MG-VUAL [hereinafter Hamilton 
Declaration]. 
248. These nine governments are the Azores, Bahamas, Bermuda, British Virgin 
Islands, Canada, Cayman Islands, Monaco, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. Id. 
249. See Collaborating Partners, SARGASSO SEA COMM’N, https://perma.cc/C7LL-
A3CQ.  
250. Hamilton Declaration, supra note 247, at annex II, ¶ (a). 
251. Rep. of the First Range States Workshop on the European Eel, supra note 
24, ¶ 171. 
252. Personal Communication with David Freestone (Sept. 1, 2017).  
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include the European eel in CMS Appendix II, and spurred the con-
certed action on the European eel adopted by the CMS Parties in 
2017.253 
10.   Prospects for coordination of the Agreement’s implementa-
tion. This criterion asks proposals to demonstrate meaningful pro-
spects for coordinating implementation of the Agreement, such as 
through hosting of a Secretariat and organizing meetings.254 It is 
beyond the scope of this Article to inquire among governments and 
institutions as to whether they are willing to host a Secretariat. 
Nonetheless, the active engagement of the Sargasso Sea Commis-
sion discussed above indicates that such prospects may be 
“good.”255 
11.   Feasibility in other respects. This criterion asks proposals 
for new Agreements to address the practical feasibility of launch-
ing and operating the Agreement by considering, for example, “po-
litical stability or diplomatic barriers.”256 The close regional prox-
imity of many of the Range States and territories, their tight 
political ties through the EU, the European Economic Area, and 
the Joint Africa-EU Strategy,257 as well as the close environmental 
working relationships among European and North African Range 
States through AEWA, the Raptors MOU, and other conservation 
agreements such as OSPAR, indicate that there are no diplomatic 
or political barriers to a European Eel Agreement. In addition, 
some of the non-EU Range States share similar concerns. Some of 
the North African Range States, for example, have banned eel fish-
ing.258 Thus, there do not appear to be any political or diplomatic 
barriers to a European Eel Agreement. 
Even without political and diplomatic barriers, it may take 
time to convince Range States that a European Eel Agreement is 
 
253. See Concerted Action on European Eel, supra note 28, at 1 (acknowledging 
that the Sargasso Sea Commission commissioned the basic science that led 
to the proposal for including the European eel in CMS Appendix II submit-
ted by Monaco). 
254. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (x). 
255. See infra Section VI.G (which explores four options for hosting a secretariat). 
256. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (xi). 
257. In 2014 at the Fourth EU-Africa Summit, European and African govern-
ments agreed to the Roadmap 2014–17. See Fourth EU–Africa Summit 
Roadmap 2014–2017, EU–Africa Summit (Apr. 3, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/PD3W-JJBE.  
258. 2016 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 103, at 49–50. 
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necessary. EU Member States, for example, may believe that 
EMPs they are developing under the EU Eel Regulation are suffi-
cient. Other Range States may have other concerns and may not 
prioritize engagement in the negotiation and implementation of an 
Eel Agreement. These challenges are difficult to assess in the ab-
stract, and it may be necessary engage in some shuttle diplomacy 
to determine whether there is real political commitment to a Euro-
pean Eel Agreement. 
12.   Likelihood of success. This criterion asks the Parties to 
evaluate certain risks, such as the uncertainty about the ecological 
effects, the lack of a “legacy mechanism” to sustain the agreement’s 
success, and activities that may undermine the Agreement’s suc-
cess.259 Unlike the previous criterion, which focuses on implemen-
tation, this criterion focuses on whether the Agreement will 
achieve its intended outcome.260 Thus, the question appears to ask 
whether an Agreement will result in the conservation of the Euro-
pean eel. 
Given the substantial lack of knowledge with respect to the 
European eel’s life history and the contribution of each threatening 
factor to the eel’s decline, it is nearly impossible to determine the 
likelihood of success that any CMS Agreement might have. How-
ever, in the absence of some mechanism to coordinate the 57 Range 
States and territories of the European eel, it seems highly unlikely 
that the eel’s conservation status will improve. 
In addition, it is not clear what is meant by the phrase “legacy 
mechanism”; Resolution 12.8 and its supporting documents do not 
provide concrete examples. To the extent that it refers to conserva-
tion strategies that will endure over time, it is simply too early to 
make that assessment. To the extent that it asks whether institu-
tions will sustain their engagement in eel conservation over the 
long-term, perhaps a more positive response is possible due to long-
term interest in eel conservation expressed by the Sargasso Sea 
Commission. Also, the European Commission, with its mandate to 
coordinate EU Member States, may qualify as a “legacy mecha-
nism,” provided that the Commission and the EU Member States 
can be convinced to participate in an Eel Agreement. 
 
259. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (xii). 
260. CMS, Developing, Resourcing and Servicing CMS Agreements: A Policy Ap-
proach, Doc. UNEP/CMS/COP11/Doc.22.2, annex 1, ¶ 6 (Aug. 5, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/Z3KZ-4CSL.  
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13.   Magnitude of likely impact. This criterion asks about the 
number of species and countries that will benefit from a proposed 
CMS Agreement, as well as the catalytic and “multiplier” effects it 
might have.261 As indicated by the response to criterion 8 above, 
the catalytic and multiplier impacts of a European Eel Agreement 
could be substantial because of the number of CMS species that 
use the Sargasso Sea and freshwater habitats also occupied by the 
eel. In addition, while 19 EU Member States are implementing the 
EU’s Eel Regulation to varying degrees, a European Eel Agree-
ment could extend coordinated eel conservation efforts to the re-
maining Range States and territories. 
14.  Provision for monitoring and evaluation. The criterion for 
monitoring and evaluation includes a long list of subcriteria that 
focus on defining a specific mechanism for monitoring and evalu-
ating relevant scientific and technical information and progress to-
wards implementation by the Parties/Signatories, among other re-
lated activities.262 Any European Eel Agreement would need a 
Secretariat and a meeting of the Parties/Signatories to review rel-
evant scientific and technical information and to coordinate con-
servation strategies across the 57 Range States and territories. 
Given the lack of scientific information about the eel’s life history 
and impacts to the eel, a scientific or advisory committee would 
need to be a key element of any European Eel Agreement. The pos-
sibilities for such a committee, including representation of the 
Working Group on Eels (“WGEEL”),263 are described more fully in 
the next section. 
VI. OPTIONS FOR A CMS LEGAL INSTRUMENT FOR 
THE EUROPEAN EEL 
A CMS legal instrument for the European eel does not fit 
neatly into any existing CMS Agreement for purposes of drawing 
comparisons. While several CMS Agreements have a broad geo-
graphic scope, they also cover multiple species (e.g., Sharks MOU, 
Raptors MOU, IOSEA Marine Turtles MOU, ACAP, and AEWA). 
 
261. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (xiii). 
262. Id. at annex, ¶ (xiv). 
263. For more about the WGEEL, see WGEEL: Joint EIFAAC/ICES/GFCM 
Working Group on Eels, ICIEM/CIEM, https://perma.cc/S63A-FF98.  
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A European Eel Agreement would have a broad, regional geo-
graphic scope but cover only one species. In addition, unlike some 
CMS Agreements that include a range of developed and developing 
Range States and territories, a European Eel Agreement would in-
clude primarily developed-country Range States. Among CMS in-
struments, perhaps only the Dugong MOU, with its single-species 
focus on the dugong (Dugong dugon) and 46 Range States, is simi-
lar in geographic and species scope, but those Range States are 
primarily least-developed and developing countries.264 Because the 
eel’s range encompasses a large number of Range States and terri-
tories—including developed European countries, developing North 
African countries, and only one least-developed country265—a Eu-
ropean Eel Agreement might be more similar to the Sharks MOU 
or the IOSEA Marine Turtle MOU, with their regional focus and 
more balanced mix of developed and developing Range States. 
Given the broad geographic region, the potential need to include 
more than one language, and the array of conservation measures 
that are needed to address eel conservation, a European Eel Agree-
ment would likely require “a central Secretariat . . . with signifi-
cant funding to maintain a level of core activity.”266 
In addition to Secretariat costs, the large number of Range 
States and territories will likely increase costs because it is as-
sumed that any European Eel Agreement will have more than one 
working language. Consequently, the Agreement will require ad-
ditional resources for coordination, translation, interpretation, and 
meetings.267 The relatively small number of developing country 
Range States, however, may benefit any such Agreement because 
few developing countries will require financial assistance to partic-
ipate in meetings. These and other issues are discussed below. 
 
264. See Dugong MOU, Dugong Summary Sheet, https://perma.cc/5ECC-UGXU. 
Fifteen of the 46 Range States are least-developed countries. List of Least 
Developed Countries, U.N. COMM. FOR DEV. POLICY (June 2017), 
https://perma.cc/4AK7-CJJY. 
265. Mauritania is the only European eel Range State listed as a least-developed 
country. List of Least Developed Countries, supra note 264.  
266. CMS Assessment of MOUs, supra note 180, at 35. 
267. Id. at 17–19. 
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A. Binding Versus Nonbinding 
As noted in the preceding section, the conservation outcomes 
of a CMS Agreement do not appear dependent on whether the 
Agreement is legally binding or not. However, the legally binding 
character of an agreement has two principal impacts in the context 
of a CMS Agreement for European eels. 
First, and as noted earlier,268 a legally binding Agreement 
takes longer to bring into force than a non-legally binding MOU. 
Given the dire conservation status of the European eel, a lengthy 
period prior to entry into force may be undesirable. 
Second, a legally binding Agreement requires financial contri-
butions from the Parties, likely based on the UN scale of assess-
ments. The Agreement’s costs, including secretariat support and 
any programmatic work, would be paid from mandatory contribu-
tions, which have led to more stable funding than MOUs (excluding 
the Gorilla Agreement).269 In addition to helping ensure the suc-
cess of the Agreement,270 such a contribution scheme would likely 
be considered fair because it is consistent with UN practice. 
A non-legally binding MOU, in contrast, would be paid from 
voluntary contributions and, given the current administration of 
MOUs, would require extensive in-kind contributions from the 
CMS Secretariat—costs that would be paid by CMS Parties only 
and not by non-Party Range States or territories. The CMS Parties 
that are also Eel MOU Signatories may perceive the non-CMS 
Party Signatories to an Eel MOU as “free riders” that are taking 
advantage of the contributions made by Parties to the CMS 
budget.271 Thirteen of the 57 Range States and territories (22.8%) 
are CMS non-Parties.272 With a relatively large number of free rid-
ers, Range States and territories may prefer a legally binding 
Agreement. Similarly, CMS Parties that are not eel Range States 
 
268. See supra Section IV.B. 
269. Lee et al., supra note 176, ¶¶ 45–58. 
270. See supra Section IV.C. 
271. Lee et al., supra note 176, ¶ 96. 
272. The thirteen are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Faroe Islands, Iceland, Lebanon, 
Macedonia, the former Yugoslav Republic, Moldova, Russia, and Turkey, in 
addition to four territories (Gibraltar, Guernsey, Isle of Man, and Jersey). 
However, these four UK territories would be covered by the UK’s participa-
tion if the UK expressly includes them on signing or ratification. Memoran-
dum on Application, U.K. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, 
https://perma.cc/DHX4-CSWQ (last updated Nov. 3, 2009). 
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may feel that all Eel MOU Signatories are consuming a dispropor-
tionate amount of the CMS budget, particularly from the CMS Ad-
ministration and Finance team which would be asked to help ad-
minister an Eel MOU, but which may not receive financial 
contributions as part of an Eel MOU. 
A strategy to avoid this conundrum might be to negotiate an 
MOU and binding Agreement simultaneously. The MOU could be 
relatively simple. It could set up an interim Secretariat and include 
an Action Plan. The MOU and its Action Plan would commence on 
signing. Meanwhile, a more developed Article IV(3) AGREEMENT 
could establish more detailed provisions, including reporting and 
monitoring obligations and a permanent Secretariat; the MOU’s 
Action Plan would carry over to the legally binding Agreement. 
This strategy is not without risk, however. The legally binding 
Agreement might never enter into force, which could result in an 
MOU that is not fully developed. If the Eel MOU is modeled on 
existing MOUs, however, then it may be possible to avoid an un-
derdeveloped Eel MOU. 
B. Scope 
To ensure that a European Eel Agreement covers the broad 
range of habitats and geographical distribution of the European 
eel, the Agreement should not attempt to define an “Agreement 
Area.” Instead, as with ACAP for albatrosses and petrels,273 a Eu-
ropean Eel Agreement should be based on the conservation of eels 
and their habitats. “Habitat” should then be defined to mean “any 
area that contains suitable living conditions, during any part of 
their life history, for eels.” 
In addition, while the First Workshop of Range States of the 
European Eel suggested that a new CMS Agreement should focus 
on the European eel, it also indicated that it could be expanded to 
include the American eel at a later date.274 To ensure that the 
Agreement can be expanded to include the American eel (see Sec-
tion VII below), the Agreement should include the species covered 
in an Appendix as CMS and many other CMS Agreements do. For 
example, the Raptors MOU applies to “Birds of Prey,” defined as 
 
273. See supra Section IV.B. 
274. Rep. of the First Range States Workshop on European Eels, supra note 24, 
¶ 145. 
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“migratory populations of Falconiformes and Strigiformes species 
occurring in Africa and Eurasia, listed in Annex 1 of this 
[MOU].”275 Likewise, the Sharks MOU applies to any migratory 
species, subspecies, or population in the Class Chondrichthyes in-
cluded in Annex 1 of the MOU.276 In a similar fashion, an Eel 
Agreement could apply to “eels” or “anguillid species” included in 
an Annex. 
C. Objective 
Ideally, a European Eel Agreement would establish a measur-
able conservation target to be achieved within a specified 
timeframe.277 ICES has recommended an escapement goal for sil-
ver eels of 50%,278 but the EU has adopted a goal of 40%.279 How-
ever, the EU Eel Regulation does not specify a timeframe for meet-
ing that goal. Instead, it calls for achieving that goal “in the long 
term.”280 Given the life history of the European eel, with individu-
als reaching sexual maturity in variable time periods, the failure 
to designate a specific timeframe for achieving the 40% escapement 
goal is understandable. Nonetheless, without a more specific 
timeframe for achieving a goal, it is difficult to determine progress 
towards the escapement target. Thus, a European Eel Agreement 
would benefit from adopting the EU’s escapement goal to ensure 
complementarity between the two regimes, but it should adopt spe-
cific timeframes for achieving the goal. 
 
275. Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation of Migratory Birds of 
Prey in Africa and Eurasia, ¶ 1(a) (opened for signature Nov. 1, 2008) (en-
tered into force Nov. 1, 2008), https://perma.cc/W7VK-ATY5  at ¶ 1(a) [here-
inafter Raptors MOU]. 
276. Sharks MOU, supra note 164, § 3(p). 
277. See Rep. of the First Range States Workshop on the European Eel, supra 
note 24, at Summary of Outcomes, § 1. 
278. 2015 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 37, at 28. 
279. EU Eel Regulation, supra note 13, at art. 2(4). 
280. Id. (“The Eel Management Plan shall be prepared with the purpose of 
achieving this objective in the long term.”) 
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D. Conservation Obligations 
1. Provisions Regarding Take and Trade 
Although the EU bans the import and export of European eels, 
the fishery still remains a significant economic activity, employing 
about 25,000 people throughout Europe to support the EU market 
for eels.281 Presumably, eel fisheries also generate significant num-
bers of jobs in non-EU States. Consequently, a European Eel 
Agreement would need to adopt harvesting rules consistent with 
the eel’s role as a source of food, bait, and jobs or, if a harvest pro-
hibition is desired, recognize the economic implications of that 
choice. 
Currently, because the European eel is included in CMS Ap-
pendix II, international law does not prohibit the taking of Euro-
pean eels.282 In addition, because the European eel is included in 
CITES Appendix II, States may allow its trade,283 provided that 
relevant CITES export permits are issued, including a finding that 
the trade will not be detrimental to the survival of the species (a 
finding known as the “non-detriment” finding).284 As noted earlier, 
exports have increased sharply in recent years.285 With a dearth of 
scientific information concerning European eels, it seems unlikely 
that an adequate non-detriment finding can be made; indeed, that 
 
281. REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON EELS AND CITES, supra note 36, at 6. 
282. See CMS, supra note 18, at arts. IV–V (not imposing any specific prohibi-
tions against take or trade). 
283. CITES, supra note 14, at art. IV (not prohibiting trade for primarily com-
mercial purposes). 
284. CITES requires exporting countries to determine that exports of Appendix 
II specimens will not be detrimental to the survival of the species, the spec-
imens were legally acquired, and for living specimens that the specimens 
will be prepared and shipped so as to avoid injury and cruel treatment. Id. 
at art. IV(2). 
285. See supra Section II.C.1. 
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was the opinion of EU scientists leading up to the EU’s ban on im-
ports and exports of European eel.286 Because CITES clearly pro-
vides that an affirmative finding of no detriment is required,287 a 
lack of scientific information should preclude issuance of an export 
permit. In addition, as the European Commission has reported, 
“[s]cientists constantly advise that all humanly induced mortality 
(fisheries and non-fishing anthropogenic mortality) should be re-
duced to as close to zero as possible and that urgent action is 
needed.”288 Thus, a European Eel Agreement may wish to adopt 
measures stronger than those provided in CITES and CMS and 
strictly regulate national and international trade.289 
If an Eel Agreement allows trade, then negotiators may want 
to consider provisions requiring the issuance of catch documents, 
as many RFMOs require for harvest of tuna290 and toothfish.291 
RFMOs have adopted catch documentation schemes (“CDS”) to 
prevent illegal, unreported, and unregulated (“IUU”) fishing.292 
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(“FAO”) has defined CDS as 
 
286. In December 2010, the Scientific Review Group (“SRG”), established under 
the EU Eel Regulation, concluded that “it was not possible for the SRG to 
consider that the capture or collection of European eel specimens in the wild 
or their export will not have a harmful effect on the conservation status of 
the species.” SCI. REVIEW GRP., SHORT SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF THE 
54TH MEETING OF THE SCIENTIFIC REVIEW GROUP ON TRADE IN WILD FAUNA 
AND FLORA ¶ 8 (2010), https://perma.cc/THU3-XAFG. 
287. CITES provides that “[a]n export permit shall only be granted when . . . a 
Scientific Authority of the State of export has advised that such export will 
not be detrimental to the survival of that species.” CITES, supra note 14, at 
art. IV(2)(a). 
288. Eel Implementation Report, supra note 105, at 7. 
289. International agreements set minimum standards unless expressly stated 
otherwise. CITES, for example, specifically recognizes the right of Parties to 
adopt measures stricter that those found in CITES. CITES, supra note 14, 
at art. XIV(1). 
290. See, e.g., International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, 
Recommendation by ICCAT Amending Recommendation 09-11 on an 
ICCAT Bluefin Tuna Catch Documentation Program, Recommendation 11-
20, at 1 (2011). 
291. Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 
Catch Documentation Scheme for Dissostichus spp., Conservation Measure 
10-05, at 1 (2016), https://perma.cc/LY2F-NLEK.  
292. See Gilles Hosch, Catch Documentation Schemes: Practices and Applicabil-
ity in Combating IUU Fishing, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., 
https://perma.cc/K864-DMC3.  
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[a] system that tracks and traces fish from the point of capture 
through unloading and throughout the supply chain. A CDS rec-
ords and certifies information that identifies the origin of fish 
caught and ensures they were harvested in a manner consistent 
with relevant national, regional and international conservation 
and management measures. The objective of the CDS is to combat 
IUU fishing by limiting access of IUU fish and fishery products to 
markets.293 
Given reports of high levels of illegal trade of European eel and 
other eel species,294 a CDS may be one possible strategy for allow-
ing harvest and trade but also ensuring that the harvest and trade 
are legal. It would allow Parties or Signatories to an Eel Agree-
ment to regulate harvest and trade more strictly than CMS and 
CITES without actually prohibiting those activities. With the Eu-
ropean eel critically endangered, the species might qualify for an 
Appendix I listing under CMS, which would prohibit the take of 
listed species, and an Appendix I listing under CITES, which 
would prohibit international trade for primarily commercial pur-
poses. A CDS for eels may, thus, represent a viable “middle 
ground.” 
Importantly, implementation of measures stricter than CMS 
or CITES for take and trade might require new implementing leg-
islation if States do not currently have legislation that allows for 
such measures. Similarly, implementation of a CDS for eels is not 
contemplated by CMS and would likely require new domestic im-
plementing legislation. A legally binding Eel Agreement might be 
necessary in order to ensure that States are compelled to adopt 
such legislation295 or have the authority to do so.296 
 
293. FAO Expert Consultation on Catch Documentation Schemes, FAO Fisheries 
and Aquaculture Rep., Doc. FIPM/R1120, app. D, § 4.1 (July 21–24, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/8YAA-2FTP.   
294. See supra Section II.C.1. 
295. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, opened for signature May 
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (“Every treaty 
in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in 
good faith.”). 
296. In some States, treaties are considered superior to domestic legal obliga-
tions. Article 55 of the French Constitution, for example, provides, in Eng-
lish translation, “Treaties or agreements duly ratified or approved shall, 
upon publication, prevail over Acts of Parliament, subject, in regard to each 
agreement or treaty, to its application by the other party.” 1958 CONST. art. 
55 (Fr.). 
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2. Eel Management Plans 
An important question that negotiators of an Eel Agreement 
must answer is whether to adopt a top-down or bottom-up ap-
proach to eel conservation. The top-down approach would consist 
of eel conservation measures that must be adopted by all Par-
ties/Signatories. For example, each Party/Signatory would be re-
quired to prohibit the take of eels or construct fish ladders around 
migration obstacles such as dams. The bottom-up approach would 
allow local and national officials to undertake nation- or basin-
wide measures to address the specific conservation challenges in 
that area. 
The Critically Endangered status of the European eel suggests 
that the top-down approach would be more effective. To ensure 
that the species recovers as quickly as possible, each Party/Signa-
tory would undertake the full range of measures identified in the 
Agreement. 
However, the top-down approach may discourage some States 
or territories from participating in the Agreement. In addition, the 
European eel may be relatively more abundant in some places; 
dams too short to pose a barrier to migration may be more preva-
lent in some Range States. Under these circumstances, a bottom-
up approach might be more effective. To quickly launch an Eel 
Agreement, the bottom-up approach, focused on basin-wide EMPs, 
may offer the most viable option, largely because the EU Member 
States, which constitute a large proportion of European eel Range 
States, have already adopted this approach through the EU Eel 
Regulation.297 Attracting EU participation may be very difficult 
under a different approach. 
Under the EU’s approach, Member States are required to pre-
pare EMPs for each river basin, which may include maritime wa-
ters, that constitutes natural habitat for the European eel.298 The 
overall goal of an EMP must be to reduce mortality “so as to permit 
with high probability the escapement to the sea of at least 40% of 
the silver eel biomass relative to the best estimate of escapement 
that would have existed if no anthropogenic influences had im-
pacted the stock.”299 The EU Eel Regulation does not specify the 
 
297. EU Eel Regulation, supra note 13, at art. 2(4).  
298. Id. at art. 2(1)–(4). 
299. Id. at art. 2(4). 
51
  
2018] Bringing the European Eel Back from the Brink 219 
types of measures that must be adopted in an EMP. Instead, Mem-
ber States may adopt measures based on local and regional condi-
tions,300 so long as those measures are designed to meet the 40% 
escapement goal “in the long term.”301 An EMP may contain a va-
riety of measures, including measures to reduce commercial fish-
ing activity, restrict recreational fishing, restock eels, make rivers 
passable, improve river habitats, transport silver eels from inland 
waters, combat predators, and reduce mortality from hydroelectric 
power turbines.302 
As of 2013, 19 Member States had adopted EMPs for 81 ba-
sins.303 According to ICES, most management actions relate to 
commercial and recreational fisheries, while other measures relate 
to hydropower-pumping station obstacles, habitat, restocking, and 
predator control.304 The EMPs have also resulted in the establish-
ment of implementation and monitoring programs and new scien-
tific studies. Of the specified management actions, 756 have been 
fully implemented, 259 partially implemented, and 107 not imple-
mented.305 
Despite these management actions, it is too early to determine 
whether the EU’s bottom-up approach is effective in achieving the 
40% escapement goal or a contribution to recovery of the stock as 
a whole.306 As the European Commission reports: 
[s]cientific advice underlines that the effectiveness of individual 
management measures cannot always be demonstrated: necessary 
data are missing or the measures concerned are not expected to 
produce their effects immediately or in the short term. For in-
stance, there is high probability that restrictions on fisheries for 
silver eel have contributed to increases in silver eel escapement. 
However, management measures targeting eels prior to the silver 
eel stage (for instance restocking) are not expected to have yet con-
tributed to increased silver eel escapement for biological reasons 
(generational lag time, ranging from approximately 5 years in 
 
300. Id. at art. 2(7). 
301. Id. at art. 2(4). 
302. Id. at art. 2(8). 
303. Eel Implementation Report, supra note 105, at 4. 
304. INT’L COUNCIL FOR THE EXPL. OF THE SEA, REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON 
EVALUATION PROGRESS EEL MANAGEMENT PLANS (WKEPEMP) 6 (2013), 
https://perma.cc/24KG-B879 [hereinafter 2013 WKEPEMP REPORT]. 
305. Id. 
306. Eel Implementation Report, supra note 105, at 5. 
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Mediterranean lagoons to 25–30 years in northern Europe). Non-
fisheries measures related to hydropower, pumping stations and 
migration obstacles are also difficult to evaluate at this point in 
time, mainly due to the site-specific nature of potential impacts 
and lack of post-evaluation data. The advice does not conclude that 
these management measures are ineffective or that will not be ef-
fective in the longer term.307 
Nonetheless, the EMPs are not without utility. The European 
Commission also reported that, of the 81 Eel Management Units 
(“EMUs”), 17 EMUs were achieving their biomass targets, and 24 
EMUs were achieving their anthropogenic mortality targets.308 
Not all the information was positive, however: 42 EMUs reported 
not achieving their biomass targets, and19 reported not achieving 
their mortality targets.309 Reporting was insufficient to evaluate 
the achievement of biomass targets for 22 EMUs and mortality tar-
gets for 38 EMUs.310 
3. Restocking 
Restocking basins with eels seems like a commonsense meas-
ure to improve abundance and increase eel recruitment. In fact, 
virtually all EU EMPs include restocking as a conservation meas-
ure.311 The EU Eel Regulation also requires a Member State that 
allows fishing for eels under 12 centimeters in total length to re-
serve a minimum of 60% of their catch for restocking purposes.312 
Scientists, however, are not convinced that restocking is a vi-
able tool for eel recovery. Some studies “unambiguously state” that 
major knowledge gaps prevent firm conclusions about the utility of 
restocking, while others suggest that eels from a stocked water-
shed migrate similarly to wild populations,313 indicating that re-
stocking could contribute to eel recovery. Others question restock-
ing’s effectiveness in increasing spawning stock.314 
 
307. Id. 
308. Id. 
309. Id. 
310. Id. 
311. Id. 
312. EU Eel Regulation, supra note 13, at art. 7(1). 
313. See JACOBY & GOLLOCK, supra note 16, at 14 (citations omitted). 
314. See Eel Implementation Report, supra note 105, at 6. 
53
  
2018] Bringing the European Eel Back from the Brink 221 
If negotiators of a European Eel Agreement include restocking 
as a tool for eel recovery, then the Agreement must ensure that 
provisions are adopted to evaluate the efficacy and effects of re-
stocking.315 One such provision could require marking of all 
stocked eels to  distinguish wild from restocked eels for sampling 
and monitoring purposes.316 
4. Provisions Relating to the Sargasso Sea 
Because European eels spawn in the Sargasso Sea,317 negoti-
ators of an Eel Agreement may wish to include provisions to pro-
tect this habitat. Parts of the Sargasso Sea lie within Bermuda’s 
exclusive economic zone, while other parts lie on the high seas (ar-
eas beyond national jurisdiction).318 Further, scientists are unclear 
exactly where spawning takes place.319 Consequently, protection 
of spawning habitat may require protection of the Sargasso Sea 
both within Bermuda’s exclusive economic zone and on the high 
seas. 
UNCLOS already prohibits the harvesting of catadromous 
species, such as the European eel, on the high seas.320 Most but not 
all European eel Range States are party to UNCLOS; Israel, Libya, 
Syria, and Turkey are the eel Range States that are not.321 To en-
sure complete coverage, an Eel Agreement would want to include 
provisions to protect eels in the high seas portions of the Sargasso 
Sea. 
 
315. Id. at 8. 
316. Håkan Wickström & Niklas B. Sjöberg, Traceability of Stocked Eels – The 
Swedish Approach, 23 ECOLOGY OF FRESHWATER FISH 33 (2014). 
317. See 2014 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 41, at 9. 
318. Dan Laffoley et al., Submission of Scientific Information to Describe Ecolog-
ically or Biologically Significant Marine Areas 5 (unpublished report pre-
sented to the Sargasso Sea Alliance), https://perma.cc/K5ZF-BXGW.  
319. Id. at 11. 
320. UNCLOS, supra note 221, at art. 67(2) (“Harvesting of catadromous species 
shall be conducted only in waters landward of the outer limits of exclusive 
economic zones. When conducted in exclusive economic zones, harvesting 
shall be subject to this article and the other provisions of this Convention 
concerning fishing in these zones.”). 
321. Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the 
Convention and the Related Agreements, U.N. OCEANS & LAW OF THE SEA, 
https://perma.cc/7VBF-4KPM (last updated Apr. 3, 2018).  
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A variety of CMS Agreements apply to the high seas and im-
pose obligations on Parties/Signatories in those areas. For exam-
ple, they apply the Agreement to the “nationals and vessels” of Par-
ties/Signatories without limiting the geographic scope to a State or 
territory’s jurisdiction. This is the approach taken by the Pacific 
Cetaceans MOU and the IOSEA Turtle MOU.322 
ACAP takes a different approach by implicitly imposing obli-
gations on Parties in high seas areas. Albatrosses and petrels are 
caught as bycatch in longline and other commercial fisheries.323 
Rather than designate areas off limits to fishing, ACAP provides 
that the Parties “shall endeavour individually and collectively to 
manage marine habitats” so as to avoid pollution that may harm 
these birds and ensure the sustainability of resources that provide 
food for them.324 Parties must also “individually or collectively seek 
to develop management plans for the most important foraging and 
migratory habitats of albatrosses and petrels”325 and “take special 
measures individually and collectively to conserve marine areas 
which they consider critical to the survival and/or restoration of 
species of albatrosses and petrels which have unfavourable conser-
vation status.”326 Because ACAP defines “habitat” as “any area 
which contains suitable living conditions for albatrosses and/or 
petrels,”327 it is clear that ACAP requires Parties to take action to 
protect high seas habitats. 
Although no oceanic eel fisheries appear to currently exist,328 
the negotiators of a European Eel Agreement could use either of 
these approaches to adopt a prohibition against eel fishing in the 
 
322. See, e.g., Pacific Islands Cetaceans MOU, supra note 152, ¶ 11; IOSEA Ma-
rine Turtles MOU, supra note 154, at “Basic Principles,” ¶ 2. 
323. About ACAP, ACAP, https://perma.cc/E3GQ-U9M6 (last updated Dec. 27, 
2017) (stating that “[o]ne of the most significant threats facing albatrosses 
and petrels is mortality resulting from interactions with fishing gear, espe-
cially longline- and trawl-fishing operations”). 
324. ACAP, supra note 147, at annex 2, ¶ 2.3.1. 
325. Id. at annex 2, ¶ 2.3.2. 
326. Id. at annex 2, ¶ 2.3.3. 
327. Id. at art. I(2)(j). 
328. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament: Development of a Community Action Plan for the Management 
of European Eel, at 4, COM (2003) 573 final (Oct. 1, 2003) (“No targeted 
fisheries take place in oceanic waters but river mouths, coastal areas with 
brackish waters and continental fresh water bodies are all subject to differ-
ent types of fisheries.”), https://perma.cc/WY6P-EV72.  
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Sargasso Sea, anywhere on the high seas, or beyond some distance 
from the coast. Such a provision would help ensure that such fish-
eries are not developed and protect the eel’s migration. In addition, 
such a prohibition would not be unusual. A variety of RFMOs have 
adopted fishing bans to protect certain habitats or species. For ex-
ample, NAFO prohibits bottom trawling on specified seamounts, 
corals, and areas with high densities of sponges.329 The South East 
Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (“SEAFO”) also bans bottom 
trawling on specified seamounts on the high seas.330 The Commis-
sion for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(“CCAMLR”) bans bottom trawling in areas of the high seas (sub-
ject to few exceptions).331 The GFCM bars fishing on certain coral 
reefs.332 The International Whaling Commission maintains a 
Southern Ocean Sanctuary in which all commercial whaling is pro-
hibited.333 In other words, if an Eel Agreement established a fish-
ing ban in the high seas portions of the Sargasso Sea, it would not 
be unusual in international law. 
As for those areas of the Sargasso Sea within Bermuda’s ex-
clusive economic zone, UNCLOS directs relevant States to cooper-
ate in the management and regulation of catadromous species.334 
The negotiators of an Eel Agreement could extend the measures 
applicable to the high seas portion of the Sargasso Sea to those 
 
329. NAFO Conservation and Enforcement Measures, supra note 107, at art. 17. 
See Daniela Diz, Current Legal Developments: The Sargasso Sea, 31 INT’L J. 
MARINE & COASTAL L. 359 (2016) (describing the efforts to ban bottom trawl-
ing in these areas). 
330. SEAFO, Conservation Measure 30/15 on Bottom Fishing Activities and Vul-
nerable Marine Ecosystems in the SEAFO Convention Area art. 5(1), Dec. 
3, 2015, https://perma.cc/2GYK-6X3G.  
331. CCAMLR, Conservation Measure 22-05: Restrictions on the Use of Bottom 
Trawling Gear in High-Seas Areas of the Convention Area, Oct. 27–Nov. 7, 
2008, https://perma.cc/YHX4-KTP6. 
332. GFCM, Recommendation GFCM/35/2011/2 on the Exploitation of Red Coral 
in the GFCM Area of Application, 2011, https://perma.cc/J4XZ-WZSQ. 
333. The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (“ICRW”) es-
tablished the International Whaling Commission (“IWC”). International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling art. III(1), Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 
1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 (entered into force Nov. 10, 1948) [hereinafter ICRW]. 
The schedule, which includes the rules for whaling, is an integral part of the 
ICRW. Id. at art. I(1). The prohibition against commercial whaling in the 
two sanctuaries is found in paragraph 7 of the Schedule. ICRW Schedule as 
Amended by the Commission at the 66th Meeting art. III, ¶ 7 (2016). 
334. UNCLOS, supra note 221, at art. 67(3). 
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areas within Bermuda’s exclusive economic zone, as the Eel Agree-
ment would be a valid forum for fulfilling this duty to cooperate. 
E. Reporting 
To ensure that the Parties/Signatories are working toward 
achieving the objective of an Eel Agreement and acting consist-
ently with their obligations and commitments, they should be re-
quired to report on their implementation of certain activities. At 
the same time, an Eel Agreement should not establish reporting 
obligations that conflict with those of other regimes, such as the 
EU Eel Regulation. The EU Eel Regulation requires Member 
States to report every three years on progress in the implementa-
tion of their EMPs. In particular, they must report the following 
information: 
(a)  for each Member State, the proportion of the silver eel bi-
omass that escapes toward the sea to spawn relative to 
the target level of 40% escapement goal; 
(b)  for those Member States without an approved EMP, the 
level of fishing effort exerted on eel each year, and the re-
duction realized relative to the 50% reduction in harvest 
required by the Eel Regulation; 
(c)  the level of mortality factors outside the fishery (e.g., 
predators, hydroelectric turbines) and the reduction in 
mortality realized; and 
(d)  the amount of glass eels caught less than 12 centimeters 
in length and the proportions of this utilized for various 
purposes.335 
It appears that the EU Member States reported on implementation 
of their EMPs in 2015, but no analysis of them has occurred.336 
Whether that indicates a problem with the reports, the reporting 
obligations themselves, or a lack of resources to undertake the 
analysis is unknown. To the extent that the reporting obligations 
themselves are not the problem, they could form the minimum 
amount of information to report under an Eel Agreement. If an Eel 
Agreement bars fishing in the Sargasso Sea or otherwise limits 
 
335. EU Eel Regulation, supra note 13, at art. 9(1). 
336. 2016 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 103, at 8 (“EU Member States again re-
ported on progress with implementing their EMPs in 2015 but no official 
post-evaluation has taken place.”). 
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fishing in areas beyond an “eel basin,” then Parties/Signatories 
should be required to report on measures taken to implement those 
restrictions. Depending on other provisions of the Agreement, dif-
ferent reporting requirements may be advisable. 
F. Advisory Body 
Any European Eel Agreement should include an advisory body 
that can provide technical advice to the participating States and 
territories. The advisory body could be a scientific committee or a 
broader technical committee. 
Due to the large number of unanswered questions concerning 
the European eel’s life history and the primary threats to the eel 
despite its precipitous population decline, a strong case can be 
made for a scientific committee that prioritizes scientific research 
needs and analyzes existing science. Most MEAs (e.g., CMS, 
CITES) and RFMOs (e.g., ICCAT, NAFO) have a dedicated scien-
tific committee.337 The Sharks MOU also has a scientific advisory 
committee.338 
At the same time, the conservation response to new scientific 
information concerning European eels may have profound impacts 
on law and policy and may require additional information concern-
ing the feasibility of adopting certain technologies or implementing 
new laws. Consequently, a broader technical committee may re-
spond more meaningfully to the needs of the participating States 
and territories. Several MEAs and CMS Agreements (e.g., 
AEWA339 and the Raptors MOU340) have adopted this approach. 
 
337. See, e.g., CMS, supra note 18, at art. VIII (establishing a Scientific Council); 
CITES Res. 11.1 (Rev. CoP17), Establishment of Committees, ¶ 2(b) (Sept. 
24–Oct. 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/4M4H-2YK7 (establishing an Animals 
Committee and a Plants Committee). 
338. Sharks MOU, supra note 164, ¶ 24. 
339. AEWA, supra note 147, at art. VI(7). For more information on the AEWA 
Technical Committee, see AEWA Technical Committee, AWEA, 
https://perma.cc/F6B2-7WHJ.  
340. Members of the Raptors Technical Advisory Group must have expertise in 
raptor research, conservation, and/or management in order to provide ad-
vice on the implementation of the Raptors MOU, analyze scientific advice 
and assessments for the purpose of proving recommendations to the Signa-
tories, and provide comments on any proposals to amend the MOU text 
which have a technical content. CMS, Report of the First Meetings of Signa-
tories of the Raptors MOU, Doc. CMS/Raptors/MoS1/Report/Annex V, ¶¶ 1, 
3–5, 8 (Dec. 10, 2013), https://perma.cc/EE2J-N52N.  
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The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Im-
portance341 has established a Scientific and Technical Review 
Panel (“STRP”), comprising scientists and “technical experts.”342 
The scientific experts provide advice on “the strategic direction of 
scientific work needed to enhance the development of STRP prod-
ucts, and ensure the scientific quality of the finished products,”343 
while the technical experts prepare “guidance, technical briefing 
notes, Ramsar Technical Reports, etc., and solicit input and feed-
back on these from stakeholders and partners in all the Ramsar 
regions.”344 
AEWA has taken an approach similar to the Ramsar Conven-
tion, although it specifies a greater range of expertise for its Tech-
nical Committee. The AEWA Technical Committee comprises: 
• Nine experts representing the different regions of the 
Agreement Area (Northern and Southwestern Europe, 
Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Southwestern Asia, 
Northern Africa, Central Africa, Western Africa, Eastern 
Africa, and Southern Africa), elected by the Parties; 
• One representative appointed by each of the following or-
ganizations: the IUCN, Wetlands International, and the 
International Council for Game and Wildlife Conserva-
tion; and 
• One thematic expert, elected by the Parties, from each of 
the following fields: rural economics, game management, 
and environmental law.345 
The general approach of AEWA might work quite well for a 
European Eel Agreement. Given the broad geographic range of the 
European eel, broad geographic representation on a technical com-
 
341. Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Water-
fowl Habitat arts. 6–7, opened for signature Feb. 2, 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 11084, 
996 U.N.T.S. 245 (entered into force Dec. 21, 1975) [hereinafter the Ramsar 
Convention]. 
342. Ramsar Convention Res. XII.5, New Framework for Delivery of Scientific 
and Technical Advice and Guidance on the Convention annex 1, ¶ 7 (June 
1–9, 2015), https://perma.cc/SBF6-9GHY.  
343. Id. ¶ 7 & n.2. 
344. Id. ¶ 7 & n.3. 
345. AEWA, Modus Operandi of the Technical Committee of the Agreement on 
the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds, Rule 2(1) (May 
14–18, 2012), https://perma.cc/Q2DQ-9N7D. 
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mittee would ensure that specific scientific and conservation con-
cerns are addressed at the advisory body level. Due to the lack of 
scientific information about the European eel, the AEWA approach 
could be modified to ensure that the nine regional representatives 
have scientific expertise, or perhaps a separate set of members 
would have that expertise. The expert in game management would 
be changed to an expert in fisheries or eel management. 
Moreover, the establishment of a more general Technical Com-
mittee would help ensure that the work of the Joint 
EIFAAC/ICES/GFCM Working Group on Eel (“WGEEL”) is not du-
plicated. Presently, the main objective of the WGEEL is to “report 
on the status of the European eel stocks and provide advice to sup-
port development and implementation of EC Regulation No. 
1100/2007 for eel stock recovery.”346 The WGEEL assesses Euro-
pean eel populations across its range.347 A member or two of the 
WGEEL could participate as an expert on the Agreement’s Tech-
nical Committee. In the alternative, the Agreement could hire the 
WGEEL to provide specific scientific services to the Parties/Signa-
tories (as the EU does).348 The arrangement could be designed as 
in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(“WCPFC”).349 The WCPFC has its own Scientific Committee,350 
but the science it reviews is provided by the Oceanic Fisheries Pro-
gramme of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community.351 
 
346. Joint EIFAAC/ICES/GFCM Working Group on Eels, INT’L COUNCIL FOR THE 
EXPL. OF THE SEA, https://perma.cc/9QM6-85L3.  
347. See, e.g., 2016 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 103, at 5, 11.  
348. See ICES and EU Sign Memorandum of Understanding, INT’L COUNCIL FOR 
THE EXPL. OF THE SEA (Mar. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/AA64-7UXX (“ICES 
provides the European Union with scientific advice on fishing opportunities 
for more than 220 fish stocks on an annual basis . . . .”).  
349. The WCPFC was established by the Convention on the Conservation and 
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean art. 9(1), Sept. 5, 2000, 2275 U.N.T.S. 40532 (entered into force 
June 19, 2004), https://perma.cc/75KV-YEJ4 [hereinafter WCPF Conven-
tion]. 
350. Id. at art. 11(1). 
351. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Commission for the Conserva-
tion and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean and the Pacific Community, at 1–3 (Mar. 15, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/2QPQ-UP2M. 
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G. Secretariat 
In addition to identifying the tasks to be performed by the Sec-
retariat, which have become somewhat boilerplate within MEAs 
(e.g., review reports, organize meetings),352 negotiators of a Euro-
pean Eel Agreement must determine 1) the location of the Secre-
tariat, 2) whether the Secretariat (and the Agreement itself) is as-
sociated with the United Nations or another entity or is 
independent (like, e.g., ACAP), 3) staff size, and 4) whether any of 
its staff are shared with CMS. These four issues are difficult to 
untangle, as they are closely interrelated. 
At the moment, at least four locations could provide some syn-
ergies for an Eel Secretariat, each with its own advantages and 
disadvantages. None of these locations or institutions has made 
any remarks about its willingness or capacity to host an Eel Secre-
tariat. As such, this section is intended only to generate discussion. 
The first and most obvious location for an Eel Secretariat is 
Bonn, sharing space with the CMS Secretariat as well as staff from 
EUROBATS, AEWA, and ASCOBANS. Sharing space with the 
CMS Secretariat has several advantages, including the possibility 
to share administrative staff. Germany has also shown an interest 
in eel conservation by virtue of its proposal, on behalf of the EU, to 
include the European eel in Appendix II of CITES.353 Germany is 
a European eel Range State as well,354 which might make it ame-
nable to hosting the secretariat. 
In addition, if the Parties/Signatories to an Eel Agreement do 
not believe that a full-time person is needed for a particular posi-
tion, it may be possible to split the position with another CMS 
Agreement, as ASCOBANS and the IOSEA Turtles MOU have 
done. The ASCOBANS Coordinator spends 75% of her time on 
ASCOBANS; the remaining time is spent as the CMS Marine 
Mammals Officer.355 Similarly, the IOSEA Coordinator serves as 
a part-time advisor to CMS, thus off-loading some of that salary on 
 
352. See, e.g., CMS, supra note 18, at art. IX. 
353. CITES, Consideration of Proposals for Amendment Of Appendices I and II, 
CITES Doc. CoP14 Prop. 18 (June 3–15, 2007), https://perma.cc/U7LY-
QYAP.  
354. JACOBY & GOLLOCK, supra note 16, at 4 
355. Lee et al., supra note 176, ¶ 71. 
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CMS.356 Such a scheme, of course, would require agreement among 
the CMS Parties. 
An advantage or disadvantage, depending on one’s perspec-
tive, of sharing space with the CMS Secretariat—and, by exten-
sion, integrating with the UN system—is that the UN charges 13% 
for Programme Support Costs (“PSC”).357 This fee is assessed 
against mandatory contributions and voluntary contributions 
alike.358 The PSC fee is charged even if the funds are for specific 
programmatic work (thus diverting programmatic funds towards 
administration).359 Part of the funds from PSC charges are re-
turned to CMS to pay for local administrative staff. The remainder 
goes to the Nairobi office of the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme to pay administrative staff there that perform tasks on 
behalf of CMS. 
One disadvantage of splitting space with the CMS Secretariat 
is that the CMS Secretariat is already operating at full capacity 
and is considered understaffed.360 Without additional personnel 
and financial resources, the CMS Secretariat will not be able to 
perform secretariat functions for a new, active Eel Agreement 
while also maintaining the same level of service for CMS and the 
other MOUs. 
In addition, if the Eel Agreement integrates with the CMS Sec-
retariat, then all the rules of the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme relating to contracting, salary, and travel would apply. 
The advantage is that these rules would not have to be written 
anew; the disadvantage is their lack of flexibility. 
A second possibility for housing the Eel Agreement Secretariat 
might be with the Sargasso Sea Commission. As noted earlier, the 
Sargasso Sea Commission has been a supporter of eel conservation, 
 
356. Id. ¶ 54. 
357. See CBD, Note on the 13 per cent Programme Support Costs (PSC), ¶ 3, 
https://perma.cc/KZH2-KMWK [hereinafter CBD Note on PSC]. 
358. See Decision 80/44, U.N. Dev. Program, 27th Sess., 706th mtg. at 560, Doc. 
E/1980/42/Rev.1 (June 27, 1980). The UN General Assembly approved the 
UNDP’s formula for use by the United Nations Secretariat. G.A. Res. 35/217, 
at art. V(2) (Dec. 17, 1980). As a program of the United Nations, UNEP, 
including the agreements under its authority (such as CMS), falls within the 
scope of the PSC formula. 
359. Some exceptions have been made to this rule; for example, the EU pays 7% 
PSC on its contributions. However, these exceptions are rare. See CBD Note 
on PSC, supra note 357, ¶¶ 6–7. 
360. Lee et al., supra note 176, ¶¶ 63–64, 132. 
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including the eel’s sole spawning area: the Sargasso Sea.361 The 
Sargasso Sea Commission is hosted by the IUCN in Washington, 
D.C., which may not be ideal for an Eel Agreement initially focused 
on the European eel. However, if the Eel Agreement is later ex-
panded to include the American eel, as discussed in Section VII, 
then locating a Secretariat within a Range State of that species 
may be more acceptable to the Range States of the European eel. 
The Anguillid Eel Specialist Group (“AESG”), hosted by the 
Zoological Society of London, offers a third possibility.362 The 
AESG identifies gaps in our scientific knowledge of anguillid spe-
cies, advocates for their conservation, and provides a forum for dis-
cussing issues relating to these species.363 The Zoological Society 
of London charges an administrative fee of 15%,364 but its London 
location would provide easy access for most Range States. 
Lastly, a fourth possibility would be to locate the Secretariat 
within the territory of a CMS party that hosts an existing CMS 
Agreement. Monaco, for example, is a European eel Range State, 
and has shown an interest in eel conservation by submitting pro-
posals to include the European eel in CMS Appendix II365 and for 
a concerted action.366 It also already hosts the ACCOBAMS Secre-
tariat, which is independent of CMS and the United Nations sys-
tem. Synergy between the two Agreements is possible. With a fully 
independent Agreement and Secretariat, whether in Monaco or 
elsewhere, the Parties/Signatories would be allowed to establish 
their own rules, including for salary, although Executive Secretar-
ies of independent secretariats appear to have salaries similar to 
those in the UN system.367 
 
361. See supra Section V(9) (describing role of the Sargasso Sea Commission). 
362. Anguillid Eel Specialist Group (AESG): About AESG, IUCN FRESHWATER 
SPECIALIST GRP.,  https://perma.cc/F7VD-57EU.  
363. Id. 
364. Personal Communication with Dr. Matthew Gollock, supra note 58. 
365. Proposal for the Inclusion of the European Eel (Anguilla anguilla) on CMS 
Appendix II, supra note 208.  
366. Concerted Action on the European Eel, supra note 28, at 1. 
367. The salary of the International Whaling Commission’s Executive Secretary 
has been posted as £94,365.97 British Pounds (USD122,477). INT’L WHALING 
COMM’N, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING 
COMMISSION: CANDIDATE INFORMATION PACK 6 (2017), 
https://perma.cc/S2RS-D9EG. The 2017 salary of the ACAP Executive Sec-
retary is AUS141,685 (USD112,385) for 2017. ACAP Res. 5.6, app. A (May 
4–8, 2015). These salaries are similar to a D-1 or D-2 position within the UN 
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Whatever choice the Parties/Signatories make, they should en-
sure that the Secretariat has legal personality.368 The Ramsar 
Convention Secretariat, for example, does not have legal personal-
ity, and consequently some Ramsar Convention Parties have had 
difficulties paying their contributions.369 
H. Finance 
To ensure the success of an Eel Agreement, the participating 
States and Territories must be willing to contribute sufficient re-
sources. As of 2010, three of the seven legally binding Agreements 
lacked funds to ensure successful implementation of their work 
plan,370 and “most” MOU operational and project-specific work was 
underfunded.371 
As noted earlier, no current CMS Agreement is an adequate 
comparator for a potential Eel Agreement. The Dugong, Sharks, 
and IOSEA Turtle MOUs are the closest comparators, but they 
have significant differences. Thus, it is difficult to assess with great 
accuracy what an Eel Agreement might cost annually. 
 
system, not accounting for benefit packages and adjustments for post loca-
tion. Pay and Benefits, U.N. CAREERS, https://perma.cc/6GB6-4VFY.  
368. The legal personality of a Secretariat is established in the Headquarters 
Agreement between the host government and the decision-making body of 
the Agreement. The first paragraph of the ACCOBAMS headquarters agree-
ment, for example, provides as follows: 
1. The Government of H.S.H. the Prince of Monaco shall recognize the 
legal personality of the Permanent Secretariat and, for the purposes 
of carrying out its statutory responsibilities, its capacity:  
- to contract,  
- to acquire and dispose of movable and immovable property,  
- to be a party to legal proceedings.  
ACCOBAMS Res. 6.2, Amendment to the Headquarters Agreement with the 
Host Government, Doc. MOP6/2016/Res.6.2, annex 1, at art. I(1) (2016), 
perma.cc/MPN4-29S6.  
369. Ramsar Convention, Legal Status of the Ramsar Convention Secretariat, 
Doc. SC36-16, at 3 (Feb. 27–29, 2008), https://perma.cc/U4CK-6NGU. For 
more information about the relationship between the Ramsar Convention 
Secretariat and the IUCN, see BHARAT H. DESAI, MULTILATERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: LEGAL STATUS OF THE SECRETARIATS 181–89 
(2010). 
370. Lee et al., supra note 176, ¶ 87. 
371. Id. ¶ 89. 
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The Dugong MOU, as noted above, covers a single species 
across 46 Range States and territories and operates in a single lan-
guage. The Dugong Secretariat is run out of the CMS office in Abu 
Dhabi.372 The Dugong MOU is staffed by a P4 Programme Officer, 
a P2 Programme Officer, and an Administrative and Finance As-
sistant.373 These full-time staff are supported by an Executive Co-
ordinator (0.33 P5 FTE) and another P2 Programme Officer (0.5 
FTE).374 When fully staffed, the core budget is slightly more than 
USD600,000.375 In addition, these staff submitted proposals to con-
duct on-the-ground conservation projects, receiving a USD5.88-
million grant.376 In other words, successful implementation of the 
Dugong MOU requires both core funding as well as project funding. 
Significantly, the Dugong MOU has been entirely funded since its 
establishment in 2009 by the Environment Agency–Abu Dhabi.377 
At the last meeting of the Signatories, the Secretariat sought to 
diversify funding by seeking voluntary contributions of 
USD120,000 for program activities from the Signatories based on 
a modified version of the UN Scale of Assessments, a proposal that 
the Signatories adopted.378 
The IOSEA Marine Turtles MOU379 may also provide a useful 
reference point. The IOSEA Marine Turtles MOU has 35 Signato-
ries; applies to the waters and coastal States of the Indian Ocean 
and Southeast Asia and adjacent seas, extending eastwards to the 
Torres Strait;380 and covers the loggerhead, olive ridley (L. oliva-
cea), green, hawksbill, leatherback, and flatback (Natator depres-
sus) sea turtles.381 The MOU’s Conservation and Management 
Plan includes 24 programs and 105 specific activities, focusing on 
reducing threats, conserving critical habitat, exchanging scientific 
 
372. See Dugong MOU Secretariat, Current Financial Status and Future Fund-
ing, Doc. CMS/Dugong/MOS3/13.1, ¶ 3 (Jan. 12, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/NS5C-GMAD.  
373. Id. at annex 1, tbls.1 & 2. 
374. Id. 
375. Id. at tbl.2. 
376. Id. ¶ 16. 
377. Id. ¶ 2. 
378. Dugong MOU, Rep. of the Third Meeting of the Signatories to the Dugong 
MOU, Doc. CMS/Dugong/MOS3*, ¶¶ 137–42 (June 14, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/6QVB-VF4J.  
379. See IOSEA Marine Turtles MOU, supra note 154.  
380. Id. at Definitions, ¶ 3.  
381. Id. at Definitions, ¶ 1. 
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data, increasing public awareness and participation, promoting re-
gional cooperation, and seeking resources for implementation.382 It 
had a budget of USD945,000 for the 2015–2017 triennium, with 
the CMS budget contributing USD27,000 per year383 towards the 
Coordinator’s salary for CMS-related work. This arrangement is 
subject to the decision of Parties on the CMS Budget at COP12. 
The Sharks MOU has a global scope and covers 29 species of 
sharks and rays across their marine habitats,384 whereas an Eel 
Agreement would be regional and would cover a single species. The 
Sharks MOU has 48 signatories,385 which may be similar to the 
number for an Eel Agreement (with 57 Range States and territo-
ries), but the Shark MOU Signatories come from all over the world, 
and many of them are developing countries that receive funding to 
participate in meetings. A much smaller number of potential par-
ticipating States and territories in an Eel Agreement are develop-
ing countries. The Sharks MOU has an Advisory Committee com-
prising 10 members.386 It operates in three languages: English, 
French, and Spanish.387 
The Sharks MOU had a budget of 1,145,866 Euros (approxi-
mately USD1,246,380 in January 2016) for the 2013–2015 trien-
nium, although it received only USD645,752 in voluntary contri-
butions to the Trust Fund (additional voluntary contributions were 
received for specific projects).388 The CMS Secretariat provided an 
additional in-kind contribution of 186,501 Euros in the form of staff 
time,389 and the German Government paid for a P2 officer for two 
of the three years of the triennium.390 The budget anticipated the 
hiring of a P3 officer, which was budgeted at 438,020 Euros for the 
triennium.391 The costs of one Meeting of the Signatories and one 
 
382. Id. at Conservation & Management Plan. 
383. IOSEA Marine Turtles MOU, Rep. of the Seventh Meeting of IOSEA Signa-
tory States, annex 6, at 83–84 (Sept. 2014), https://perma.cc/UUA3-LL5Y. 
384. Sharks: Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation of Migratory 
Sharks, CMS ANIMALS, https://perma.cc/GF2R-3FEW. 
385. Id. 
386. Sharks MOU, supra note 164, at annex 2, at 1. 
387. Id. ¶ 34. 
388. Sharks MOU, Rep. on the Implementation of the Budget for the Triennium 
2013–2015, Doc. CMS/Sharks/MOS2/Doc.10.2 ¶¶ 3, 5 (Jan. 7, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/F9N4-94XP. 
389. Id. ¶ 3. 
390. Id. ¶ 10. 
391. Id. at annex 2, at 7. 
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meeting of the Advisory Committee were estimated at 235,553 Eu-
ros,392 with a large portion of those costs allocated to interpretation 
(30,000 Euros) and support for delegate participation (82,500 Eu-
ros).393 The costs of hosting a Meeting of the Signatories do not 
account for the costs borne by the host government; Costa Rica, the 
host of the First Advisory Committee meeting and the Second 
Meeting of the Signatories, was financially responsible for the 
venue (including microphones and other relevant technology for 
the meeting), a work room for the Secretariat, and rooms for work-
ing groups.394 
The Sharks MOU budget for the 2016–2018 triennium is 
1,037,829 Euros, which covers a P2 position395 and 50% of an ad-
ministrative position,396 with additional in-kind support provided 
by the CMS Secretariat.397 This budget covers meetings but very 
little programmatic work, with only 15,000 Euros per year allo-
cated for analytical work.398 Other aspects of the work plan are 
implemented by the single P2 position. 
Because of the relatively small number of developing countries 
that would require travel assistance, presumably the budget for a 
European Eel Agreement would have smaller amounts allocated 
for this purpose.399 Similarly, the use of only two languages would 
reduce the cost of interpretation and translation significantly. 
Staff costs would be dependent on the number and type of person-
nel hired. But given the similarity in scope to the Sharks MOU, 
 
392. Id. ¶ 14. 
393. Id. at annex 2, at 8. 
394. Letter from Bradnee Chambers, Exec. Sec’y, CMS, to Edgar Gutiérrez Es-
pleta, Minister for Env’t & Energy, Costa Rica (July 13, 2015). 
395. In the United Nations system, a P2 position is a professional position that 
requires a minimum of two years of work experience. Staff Categories, U.N. 
CAREERS, https://perma.cc/U2FZ-PNQX. 
396. Sharks MOU, Administrative and Budgetary Matters, Doc. 
CMS/Sharks/Outcome 2.5, annex 1, at 2 (Feb. 20, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/B2CB-TABG. 
397. Id. 
398. Id. 
399. The following European eel Range States appear to be eligible for funding: 
Albania, Algeria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Georgia, Leba-
non Libya, Macedonia Mauritania, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Syrian 
Arab Republic Tunisia and Ukraine. 
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one full-time P2 or P3 professional officer and one part-time ad-
ministrative assistant would be considered a minimal require-
ment. 
As for languages of a European Eel Agreement, English and 
Arabic might be the two most relevant. The Range States of Europe 
speak more than a dozen languages, but English would be a com-
mon language spoken by most government officials. Arabic is the 
most common first language among other Range States (Algeria, 
Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia). Making Ar-
abic an official language may entice these Range States to partici-
pate. While Arabic is not a working language of CMS or any of its 
Agreements, this could be accommodated without too much diffi-
culty. 
VII. EXTENSION TO THE AMERICAN EEL 
The American eel (A. rostrata) also faces conservation chal-
lenges, although they do not appear to be as severe as those facing 
the European eel. The American eel has been classified as “Endan-
gered” on the IUCN Red List for reasons similar to the European 
eel: “hydropower turbines; poor body condition; climate change 
and/or changes in oceanic currents; disease and parasites (partic-
ularly A. crassus); exploitation and trade of glass, yellow and silver 
eels; hydrology; habitat loss; pollutants; and predation.”400 As with 
the European eel, the scientific data gaps concerning the life his-
tory and threats to the American eel are significant.401 Conse-
quently, the question arises as to whether a European Eel Agree-
ment could be expanded to include the American eel.402 
Procedurally, the inclusion of the American eel could be easily 
arranged. As with other Agreements, the species to be protected 
would be placed in an Annex to the Eel Agreement. The Par-
ties/Signatories could add species to the Annex at subsequent 
 
400. DAVID JACOBY ET AL., IUCN, THE IUCN RED LIST OF THREATENED SPECIES – 
ANGUILLA ROSTRATE, AMERICAN EEL 2 (2017), https://perma.cc/R8JL-HTAT. 
401. See id. at 2, 3, 6, 16 (noting the “relative lack of understanding of the 
threats”); see also U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., AMERICAN EEL (ANGUILLA 
ROSTRATA) – 12-MONTH PETITION FINDING FORM 7 (2015), 
https://perma.cc/8M2X-P4KQ (stating that “no rangewide estimate of Amer-
ican eel abundance exists” and “specific information on demographic struc-
ture is lacking and difficult to determine”). 
402. Rep. of the First Range States Workshop on the European Eel, supra note 
24, ¶¶ 145–52. 
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meetings, provided that the Agreement gives the Parties/Signato-
ries that authority. This is, of course, the way CMS itself oper-
ates,403 as does ACAP,404 AEWA,405 and the Sharks MOU,406 
among others.407 
The oddity of this approach under an Eel Agreement is that 
none of the Range States of the American eel are likely to partici-
pate in the vote to include the American eel in the Agreement’s 
Annex since they are unlikely to be a Party/Signatory to an Eel 
Agreement focusing on the European eel. Nonetheless, Parties/Sig-
natories frequently add species to the list of covered species in the 
absence of a Range State408 or even against the will of a Range 
State.409 Presumably, however, the Eel Agreement would include 
provisions to allow for participation as observers by non-Range 
States and non-Parties or non-Signatories, as is generally the case 
in multilateral environmental agreements410 and CMS MOUs.411 
In this way, they would be allowed to participate in the discussions 
and voice their opinions, although they would not have the right to 
vote. 
 
403. CMS, supra note 18, at art. XI. 
404. ACAP, supra note 147, at art. VIII(13)(a)–(e). 
405. AEWA, supra note 147, at art. X(5). 
406. Sharks MOU, supra note 164, ¶ 20. 
407. Raptors MOU, supra note 275, ¶¶ 15, 22. 
408. Several shark species were included in the CMS Appendix II at COP11 de-
spite the absence of or lack of participation by many Range States, such as 
the United States, Canada, and Mexico, all of whom are CMS non-Parties. 
However, many of shark Range States did participate and agree to list these 
shark species. Parties and Range States, CMS, https://perma.cc/GE4F-
ADD3 (last updated Dec. 1, 2017).   
409. For example, the southern African countries have been opposed to many of 
the decisions taken concerning the African elephant in CITES. In 2016, Na-
mibia and Zimbabwe submitted proposals 14, 15, and 16 to allow commercial 
trade in ivory and other elephant specimens while many West and East Af-
rican countries sought to prohibit all commercial trade in ivory and other 
elephant parts. See Seventeenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties—
Proposals for Amendment of Appendices I and II, CITES, 
https://perma.cc/GFZ2-6BVZ.  
410. See, e.g., CMS, supra note 18, at art. VII(8); CITES, supra note 14, at art. 
XI(6). 
411. See, e.g., Sharks MOU, supra note 164, ¶ 22. 
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The inclusion of the American eel, with 43 additional Range 
States and territories,412 in an Eel Agreement would certainly in-
crease costs. Many of these States and territories are developing 
countries that would require funds to participate in meetings. In 
addition, several speak Spanish as their native language.413 Add-
ing this language to the Agreement would likely enhance their par-
ticipation but, of course, would also add costs for translation and 
interpretation. Adding the American eel to an Eel Agreement 
would likely also require expansion of any advisory committee to 
accommodate the scientific and technical expertise from relevant 
Range States and territories. 
Because the American eel and the European eel face similar 
threats, it is possible that any Action Plan developed for the Euro-
pean eel could also apply to the American eel. Action plans are in-
tended to be iterative documents subject to amendment, so any ac-
tions specific to the American eel could be incorporated into the 
action plan at a meeting of the Parties/Signatories. 
Some participants at the First Range States Workshop on the 
European Eel noted that more management work was needed in 
American eel Range States before inclusion of the American eel in 
the Agreement would be productive.414 On the one hand, inclusion 
of the American eel in the Agreement could catalyze development 
of management plans. On the other hand, the lack of eel manage-
ment expertise could establish obligations that simply are not im-
plementable in a reasonable period of time. Clearly, the Range 
States will need to determine which step to take first. 
 
412. The Range States and territories are Anguilla; Antigua and Barbuda; 
Aruba; Bahamas; Barbados; Belize; Bermuda; Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and 
Saba; Canada; Cayman Islands; Colombia; Costa Rica; Cuba; Curaçao; Dom-
inica; Dominican Republic; Greenland; Grenada; Guadeloupe; Haiti; Hondu-
ras; Jamaica; Martinique; Mexico; Montserrat; Nicaragua; Panama; Puerto 
Rico; Saint Barthélemy; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint Martin 
(French part); Saint Pierre and Miquelon; Saint Vincent and the Grena-
dines; Sint Maarten (Dutch part); Trinidad and Tobago; Turks and Caicos 
Islands; United States; Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of; Virgin Islands, 
British; and Virgin Islands, United States. JACOBY ET AL., supra note 400, at 
4. 
413. Colombia, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and 
Venezuela. Id. 
414. Rep. of the First Range States Workshop on the European Eel, supra note 
24, ¶¶ 147–48. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The European eel is considered “Critically Endangered.” Its 
population continues to decline due to overutilization, barriers to 
migration such as dams, habitat loss, pollution, and climate 
change. The international community has responded by including 
the European eel in Appendix II of CITES in order to regulate in-
ternational trade, the List of Threatened and/or Declining species 
under OSPAR to help establish conservation priorities to protect 
marine biodiversity, and Appendix II of CMS to help improve the 
species conservation status. The EU has taken regional action to 
prohibit imports into and exports from EU Member States, alt-
hough intra-EU trade is permissible. 
Despite this international and regional action, the eel’s con-
servation status might not be improving. The eel’s Appendix II sta-
tus on CITES regulates only international trade; CITES does not 
have competence to address other threats to the eel. OSPAR is lim-
ited to an area in the Northeast Atlantic, omitting vast areas of the 
eel’s range. The CMS Appendix II listing for the European eel does 
not impose any specific conservation obligations on the Parties. No 
other international treaty has the competence to manage the full 
suite of threats across the European eel’s range. 
The conservation of the European eel would benefit from in-
ternational management coordinated through a new international 
legal instrument. CMS, with the possibility for legally binding and 
non-legally binding instruments, provides an opportunity to coor-
dinate those efforts. Unlike other international agreements, a legal 
instrument negotiated under CMS can cover the full range of the 
European eel’s habitat, including all freshwater and marine habi-
tats, and address the full range of threats to the species. 
Evidence indicates that the legal status of a CMS instrument 
is not per se indicative of whether the instrument will be success-
ful. However, legally binding CMS instruments tend to have more 
stable funding, and stable funding is linked to more successful con-
servation outcomes. If a commitment of funds can be arranged, a 
non-legally binding MOU may more quickly enter into force and 
achieve conservation benefits for the species. 
Regardless of the instrument’s legal status, it should include 
a range of provisions, such as those to prohibit or regulate taking; 
prohibit or regulate trade, potentially through a CDS; establish an 
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advisory body to bring new scientific information to bear on possi-
ble new management strategies; and reporting obligations to help 
monitor the success or failure of management strategies. 
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